diff --git a/library/helpers/getRawUrlPath.test.ts b/library/helpers/getRawUrlPath.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1813674e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/helpers/getRawUrlPath.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+import * as t from "tap";
+import { getRawUrlPath } from "./getRawUrlPath";
+
+t.test("it returns the raw URL path", async (t) => {
+  t.equal(getRawUrlPath(""), "/");
+  t.equal(getRawUrlPath("/"), "/");
+  t.equal(getRawUrlPath("/?test=abc"), "/");
+  t.equal(getRawUrlPath("#"), "/");
+  t.equal(getRawUrlPath("https://example.com"), "/");
+
+  t.equal(
+    getRawUrlPath("https://example.com/path/to/resource"),
+    "/path/to/resource"
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    getRawUrlPath("http://example.com/path/to/resource/"),
+    "/path/to/resource/"
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    getRawUrlPath("https://example.com/path/to/resource/123"),
+    "/path/to/resource/123"
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    getRawUrlPath("https://example.com/path/to/resource/123/456"),
+    "/path/to/resource/123/456"
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    getRawUrlPath("https://example.com/path/to/resource/123/456/789"),
+    "/path/to/resource/123/456/789"
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    getRawUrlPath(
+      "https://example.com/path/to/resource/123/456/789?query=string"
+    ),
+    "/path/to/resource/123/456/789"
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    getRawUrlPath("https://example.com/path/to/resource/123/456/789#fragment"),
+    "/path/to/resource/123/456/789"
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    getRawUrlPath(
+      "https://example.com/path/to/resource/123/456/789?query=string#fragment"
+    ),
+    "/path/to/resource/123/456/789"
+  );
+});
diff --git a/library/helpers/getRawUrlPath.ts b/library/helpers/getRawUrlPath.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f83876739
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/helpers/getRawUrlPath.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+export function getRawUrlPath(url: string): string {
+  let partialUrl = url;
+
+  // Remove protocol (http://, https://, etc.)
+  const pathStart = partialUrl.indexOf("://");
+  if (pathStart !== -1) partialUrl = partialUrl.slice(pathStart + 3);
+
+  // Remove hostname and port
+  const slashIndex = partialUrl.indexOf("/");
+  if (slashIndex === -1) return "/"; // only hostname given
+  partialUrl = partialUrl.slice(slashIndex);
+
+  // Remove query and fragment
+  const queryIndex = partialUrl.indexOf("?");
+  const hashIndex = partialUrl.indexOf("#");
+
+  let endIndex = partialUrl.length;
+  if (queryIndex !== -1) endIndex = Math.min(endIndex, queryIndex);
+  if (hashIndex !== -1) endIndex = Math.min(endIndex, hashIndex);
+
+  return partialUrl.slice(0, endIndex) || "/";
+}
diff --git a/library/sources/HTTPServer.test.ts b/library/sources/HTTPServer.test.ts
index 9f5c71258..99c129413 100644
--- a/library/sources/HTTPServer.test.ts
+++ b/library/sources/HTTPServer.test.ts
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ t.test("it blocks path traversal in path", async (t) => {
 
       t.equal(
         response,
-        "Zen has blocked a path traversal attack: path.join(...) originating from url."
+        "Zen has blocked a path traversal attack originating from url.path."
       );
       server.close();
       resolve();
@@ -921,6 +921,56 @@ t.test(
   }
 );
 
+t.test(
+  "it blocks path traversal in path even if its not directly used",
+  async (t) => {
+    const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
+      res.statusCode = 200;
+      res.end("Hello, world!");
+    });
+
+    await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
+      server.listen(3328, async () => {
+        const response = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+          // Directly using http.request with a url-like object to prevent path normalization that would remove /../
+          const req = http.request(
+            {
+              hostname: "localhost",
+              port: 3328,
+              path: "/../package.json", // Path traversal attempt
+              method: "GET",
+            },
+            (res) => {
+              let data = "";
+
+              res.on("data", (chunk) => {
+                data += chunk;
+              });
+
+              res.on("end", () => {
+                resolve(data);
+              });
+            }
+          );
+
+          req.on("error", (err) => {
+            reject(err);
+          });
+
+          req.end();
+        });
+
+        t.equal(
+          response,
+          "Zen has blocked a path traversal attack originating from url.path."
+        );
+        server.close();
+        resolve();
+      });
+    });
+  }
+);
+
 t.test("rate limiting works with url encoded paths", async (t) => {
   const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
     const result = shouldBlockRequest();
diff --git a/library/sources/http-server/checkIfRequestIsBlocked.ts b/library/sources/http-server/checkIfRequestIsBlocked.ts
index 6d30dd2df..1ce6b083c 100644
--- a/library/sources/http-server/checkIfRequestIsBlocked.ts
+++ b/library/sources/http-server/checkIfRequestIsBlocked.ts
@@ -4,6 +4,10 @@ import { Agent } from "../../agent/Agent";
 import { getContext } from "../../agent/Context";
 import { escapeHTML } from "../../helpers/escapeHTML";
 import { ipAllowedToAccessRoute } from "./ipAllowedToAccessRoute";
+import { checkUrlPathForPathTraversal } from "../../vulnerabilities/path-traversal/checkUrlPathForPathTraversal";
+import { cleanupStackTrace } from "../../helpers/cleanupStackTrace";
+import { getLibraryRoot } from "../../helpers/getLibraryRoot";
+import { attackKindHumanName } from "../../agent/Attack";
 
 const checkedBlocks = Symbol("__zen_checked_blocks__");
 
@@ -147,5 +151,35 @@ export function checkIfRequestIsBlocked(
     return true;
   }
 
+  // Only checks the url path for path traversal attacks, other inputs are checked using the sinks
+  const pathTraversalResult = checkUrlPathForPathTraversal(context.url);
+  if (pathTraversalResult && pathTraversalResult.found) {
+    const stackTraceError = new Error();
+
+    agent.onDetectedAttack({
+      module: "http",
+      operation: "",
+      kind: "path_traversal",
+      source: "url",
+      blocked: agent.shouldBlock(),
+      stack: cleanupStackTrace(stackTraceError.stack!, getLibraryRoot()),
+      paths: [".path"],
+      metadata: {},
+      request: context,
+      payload: pathTraversalResult.payload,
+    });
+
+    if (agent.shouldBlock()) {
+      res.statusCode = 403;
+      res.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain");
+
+      res.end(
+        `Zen has blocked ${attackKindHumanName("path_traversal")} originating from url.path.`
+      );
+
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
   return false;
 }
diff --git a/library/vulnerabilities/path-traversal/checkUrlPathForPathTraversal.test.ts b/library/vulnerabilities/path-traversal/checkUrlPathForPathTraversal.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7c452dc3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/vulnerabilities/path-traversal/checkUrlPathForPathTraversal.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+import * as t from "tap";
+import { checkUrlPathForPathTraversal } from "./checkUrlPathForPathTraversal";
+
+t.test("it does not detect", async (t) => {
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("").found, false);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("").payload, undefined);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("abc").found, false);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/").found, false);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc").found, false);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/a?test=123").found, false);
+
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("https://example.com/path/to/resource").found,
+    false
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("https://example.com/path/to/resource/").found,
+    false
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("https://example.com/path/to/resource/123")
+      .found,
+    false
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("https://example.com/path/to/resource/123/456")
+      .found,
+    false
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal(
+      "https://example.com/path/to/resource/123/456/789"
+    ).found,
+    false
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal(
+      "https://example.com/path/to/resource/123/456/789?query=string"
+    ).found,
+    false
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal(
+      "https://example.com/path/to/resource/123/456/789#fragment"
+    ).found,
+    false
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal(
+      "https://example.com/path/to/resource/123/456/789?query=string#fragment"
+    ).found,
+    false
+  );
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("https://example.com/path/to/resource/%C3%A4")
+      .found,
+    false
+  );
+
+  // Invalid url encoded characters
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("https://example.com/path/to/resource/%a")
+      .found,
+    false
+  );
+});
+
+t.test("only detect in path segments", async (t) => {
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/test#/../").found, false);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/test?param=/../etc").found, false); // Query parameters are checked differently
+});
+
+t.test("it detects", async (t) => {
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/..").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/../").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/..").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/..").payload, "/abc/..");
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/../def").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/def/..").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/def/../ghi").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/def/../../ghi").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/def/../../../ghi").found, true);
+
+  // With backslashes
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/..\\").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/..\\\\").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/..\\").found, true);
+
+  // With URL encoding
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/%2E%2E").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/%2E%2E/").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/%2E%2E").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/%2E%2E").payload, "/abc/%2E%2E");
+
+  // With space characters
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/.%09./").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/.%0a./def").found, true);
+  t.equal(checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/.%0D./def").found, true);
+  t.equal(
+    checkUrlPathForPathTraversal("/abc/.%0D./def").payload,
+    "/abc/.%0D./def"
+  );
+});
diff --git a/library/vulnerabilities/path-traversal/checkUrlPathForPathTraversal.ts b/library/vulnerabilities/path-traversal/checkUrlPathForPathTraversal.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..190e49072
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/vulnerabilities/path-traversal/checkUrlPathForPathTraversal.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+import { getRawUrlPath } from "../../helpers/getRawUrlPath";
+import { safeDecodeURIComponent } from "../../helpers/safeDecodeURIComponent";
+import { normalizeLikeURLConstructor } from "./normalizeLikeURLConstructor";
+
+const forbiddenPattern = /(?:^|[\\/])\.\.(?:[\\/]|$)/;
+
+/**
+ * Check if the URL path contains a path traversal attack
+ * A legitimate URL path should not contain ".." or "/../" or "\..\" or "\..\"
+ * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-5.2.4
+ */
+export function checkUrlPathForPathTraversal(url: string | undefined): {
+  found: boolean;
+  payload?: string;
+} {
+  if (!url || url.length < 3) {
+    // Performance optimization, url most include at least 3 characters (/..)
+    return {
+      found: false,
+    };
+  }
+
+  const rawPath = getRawUrlPath(url);
+  if (rawPath.length < 3) {
+    // Performance optimization, we don't need to check for path traversal if the path is less than 3 characters
+    // Can happen if the URL has a query string
+    return {
+      found: false,
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (forbiddenPattern.test(rawPath)) {
+    return {
+      found: true,
+      payload: rawPath,
+    };
+  }
+
+  if (!url.includes("%")) {
+    // Performance optimization, if the URL does not contain any encoded characters, we don't need to decode it
+    return {
+      found: false,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Also check encoded paths
+  const decodedPath = safeDecodeURIComponent(rawPath);
+  if (!decodedPath) {
+    return {
+      found: false,
+    };
+  }
+
+  const normalizedDecodedPath = normalizeLikeURLConstructor(decodedPath);
+  if (forbiddenPattern.test(normalizedDecodedPath)) {
+    return {
+      found: true,
+      payload: rawPath,
+    };
+  }
+
+  return {
+    found: false,
+  };
+}
diff --git a/library/vulnerabilities/path-traversal/normalizeLikeURLConstructor.ts b/library/vulnerabilities/path-traversal/normalizeLikeURLConstructor.ts
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ab46b3689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/library/vulnerabilities/path-traversal/normalizeLikeURLConstructor.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/**
+ * This function is used for urls, because they can contain a TAB, carriage return or line feed that is silently removed by the URL constructor.
+ *
+ * The WHATWG URL spec defines the following:
+ * - Remove all ASCII tab or newline from input.
+ * - An ASCII tab or newline is U+0009 TAB, U+000A LF, or U+000D CR.
+ *
+ * Also, backslashes are converted to forward slashes by the URL constructor.
+ *
+ * See https://url.spec.whatwg.org/#url-parsing
+ */
+export function normalizeLikeURLConstructor(url: string): string {
+  return url.replace(/[\t\n\r]/g, "").replace(/\\/g, "/");
+}