Hey — we ran an automated security scan of pentest-mcp using the AgentsID Scanner and wanted to share the results.
Summary
| Metric |
Value |
| Tools scanned |
19 |
| Security score |
0/100 (Grade: F) |
| Critical findings |
Arbitrary code execution, no auth |
| High findings |
22 |
| Medium findings |
16 |
| Risk tags |
execution, mutation |
Key Findings
Arbitrary Code Execution (Critical)
runJohnTheRipper and runHashcat execute arbitrary code with no scope restriction — any input is passed directly to execution
No Authentication (High)
- No authentication mechanism — server accepts any unauthenticated connection
Missing Tool Descriptions (High/Hallucination)
- Multiple tools have no descriptions — the LLM infers behavior from the tool name alone, which leads to unpredictable execution patterns
Category Breakdown:
- permissions: F | validation: F | hallucination: F | auth: B | output: A
How to Reproduce
npx @agentsid/scanner@latest pentest-mcp
Context
We understand this is a pentest tool and many of these findings are "by design" — running JtR and hashcat is the point. But from an MCP security perspective, an agent connecting to this server with no auth and no scope restrictions means any prompt injection in the agent's context could trigger these tools. Adding basic auth and tool-level confirmation gates would significantly reduce the blast radius.
This is part of a census-scale audit of the MCP ecosystem — 15,982 servers scanned, 137,070 findings. Full research: Weaponized by Design
Full results: agentsid.dev/registry
Hey — we ran an automated security scan of
pentest-mcpusing the AgentsID Scanner and wanted to share the results.Summary
Key Findings
Arbitrary Code Execution (Critical)
runJohnTheRipperandrunHashcatexecute arbitrary code with no scope restriction — any input is passed directly to executionNo Authentication (High)
Missing Tool Descriptions (High/Hallucination)
Category Breakdown:
How to Reproduce
Context
We understand this is a pentest tool and many of these findings are "by design" — running JtR and hashcat is the point. But from an MCP security perspective, an agent connecting to this server with no auth and no scope restrictions means any prompt injection in the agent's context could trigger these tools. Adding basic auth and tool-level confirmation gates would significantly reduce the blast radius.
This is part of a census-scale audit of the MCP ecosystem — 15,982 servers scanned, 137,070 findings. Full research: Weaponized by Design
Full results: agentsid.dev/registry