add pdf title page and adapt some heading levels

Author: sebix

mkdocs.yml

@@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ plugins:
       combined: true
       pandoc_template: eisvogel.latex
       combined_output_path: document.pdf
-      pandoc_extra_args: '--resource-path=report/deployment:deployment:report:. --toc --number-sections=true'
+      pandoc_extra_args: '--file-scope=true --resource-path=report/deployment:deployment:report:. --toc --number-sections=true'
   - search
 
 theme: readthedocs
-

report/deployment/incentives.md

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Deployment Incentives
+## Deployment Incentives
 
 As mentioned in the [overview](../index.md) section, we see a game-theoretic problem: most organizations that host web services might not have the proper incentives to protect the client's privacy without additional rewards: they have no incentive to do so. Instead, managing the complex ECH setup adds additional business continuity risks.
 

report/index.md

@@ -1,3 +1,20 @@
+---
+title: Remaining weaknesses in ECH (Encrypted Client Hello)
+author:
+  - L. Aaron Kaplan
+  - Sebastian Wagner
+date: 2025-06-25
+keywords:
+  - ECH
+  - Encrypted Client Hello
+  - Server Name Indication
+  - ESNI
+  - Security
+  - Privacy
+titlepage: "true"
+toc-own-page: "true"
+subtitle: The consequences of the adoption of ECH and its related protocols
+---
 # About this report
 
 The following security analysis tries to identify weaknesses in the ECH protocol (especially as it also interfaces with lots of other protocols).

report/scope.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Scope
 
-This report mainly focuses on 
+This report mainly focuses on
 
 * problems with deploying ECH and how to adress these,
 * sources of misconfigurations
@@ -9,10 +9,9 @@ This report mainly focuses on
 * possibilities for censorship or denial of service
 * the interface layers between protocols which play together to make ECH possible
 
-# None-scope
+## None-scope
 
 The report does *NOT* try to
 
 * analyse if the used cryptographic libraries, primitives or algorithms are safe (or quantum resistant)
 * prove the security of individual implementations (or the lack of, by breaking or analysing concrete implementations)
-