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functional_tests.rs
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// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
// history.
//
// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
// licenses.
//! Tests that test standing up a network of ChannelManagers, creating channels, sending
//! payments/messages between them, and often checking the resulting ChannelMonitors are able to
//! claim outputs on-chain.
use crate::chain;
use crate::chain::{ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen, Watch};
use crate::chain::chaininterface::LowerBoundedFeeEstimator;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor;
use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
use crate::sign::{ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PathFailure, PaymentPurpose, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret, PaymentHash};
use crate::ln::channel::{commitment_tx_base_weight, COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC, CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER, FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, COINBASE_MATURITY, ChannelPhase};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PaymentId, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA};
use crate::ln::channel::{DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS, ChannelError};
use crate::ln::{chan_utils, onion_utils};
use crate::ln::chan_utils::{OFFERED_HTLC_SCRIPT_WEIGHT, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
use crate::routing::gossip::{NetworkGraph, NetworkUpdate};
use crate::routing::router::{Path, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, get_route, RouteParameters};
use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
use crate::ln::msgs;
use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, RoutingMessageHandler, ErrorAction};
use crate::util::test_channel_signer::TestChannelSigner;
use crate::util::test_utils::{self, WatchtowerPersister};
use crate::util::errors::APIError;
use crate::util::ser::{Writeable, ReadableArgs};
use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, ScriptBuf};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
use bitcoin::{Sequence, Transaction, TxIn, TxOut, Witness};
use bitcoin::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
use crate::io;
use crate::prelude::*;
use alloc::collections::BTreeSet;
use core::iter::repeat;
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
use crate::ln::chan_utils::CommitmentTransaction;
use super::channel::UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS;
#[test]
fn test_insane_channel_opens() {
// Stand up a network of 2 nodes
use crate::ln::channel::TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS;
let mut cfg = UserConfig::default();
cfg.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(cfg)]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Instantiate channel parameters where we push the maximum msats given our
// funding satoshis
let channel_value_sat = 31337; // same as funding satoshis
let channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sat, &cfg);
let push_msat = (channel_value_sat - channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
// Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channel_value_sat, push_msat, 42, None, None).unwrap();
// Extract the channel open message from node0 to node1
let open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// Test helper that asserts we get the correct error string given a mutator
// that supposedly makes the channel open message insane
let insane_open_helper = |expected_error_str: &str, message_mutator: fn(msgs::OpenChannel) -> msgs::OpenChannel| {
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &message_mutator(open_channel_message.clone()));
let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 1);
let expected_regex = regex::Regex::new(expected_error_str).unwrap();
if let MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref action, .. } = msg_events[0] {
match action {
&ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { .. } => {
nodes[1].logger.assert_log_regex("lightning::ln::channelmanager", expected_regex, 1);
},
_ => panic!("unexpected event!"),
}
} else { assert!(false); }
};
use crate::ln::channelmanager::MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT;
// Test all mutations that would make the channel open message insane
insane_open_helper(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 1, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS + 2; msg });
insane_open_helper(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS).as_str(), |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis = TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS; msg });
insane_open_helper("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis", |mut msg| { msg.channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1; msg });
insane_open_helper(r"push_msat \d+ was larger than channel amount minus reserve \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.push_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 + 1; msg });
insane_open_helper("Peer never wants payout outputs?", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis + 1 ; msg });
insane_open_helper(r"Minimum htlc value \(\d+\) was larger than full channel value \(\d+\)", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat = (msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000; msg });
insane_open_helper("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.to_self_delay = MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT + 1; msg });
insane_open_helper("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 0; msg });
insane_open_helper("max_accepted_htlcs was 484. It must not be larger than 483", |mut msg| { msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs = 484; msg });
}
#[test]
fn test_funding_exceeds_no_wumbo_limit() {
// Test that if a peer does not support wumbo channels, we'll refuse to open a wumbo channel to
// them.
use crate::ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO;
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let mut node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
*node_cfgs[1].override_init_features.borrow_mut() = Some(channelmanager::provided_init_features(&test_default_channel_config()).clear_wumbo());
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
match nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1, 0, 42, None, None) {
Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
assert_eq!(format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO + 1), err);
},
_ => panic!()
}
}
fn do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(send_from_initiator: bool) {
// A peer providing a channel_reserve_satoshis of 0 (or less than our dust limit) is insecure,
// but only for them. Because some LSPs do it with some level of trust of the clients (for a
// substantial UX improvement), we explicitly allow it. Because it's unlikely to happen often
// in normal testing, we test it explicitly here.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
// Have node0 initiate a channel to node1 with aforementioned parameters
let mut push_amt = 100_000_000;
let feerate_per_kw = 253;
let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
push_amt -= feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + 4 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000 * 1000;
push_amt -= get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(100_000, &default_config) * 1000;
let temp_channel_id = nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, if send_from_initiator { 0 } else { push_amt }, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let mut open_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
if !send_from_initiator {
open_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
open_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
}
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_message);
// Extract the channel accept message from node1 to node0
let mut accept_channel_message = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
if send_from_initiator {
accept_channel_message.channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
accept_channel_message.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
}
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel_message);
{
let sender_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[1] } else { &nodes[0] };
let counterparty_node = if send_from_initiator { &nodes[0] } else { &nodes[1] };
let mut sender_node_per_peer_lock;
let mut sender_node_peer_state_lock;
let channel_phase = get_channel_ref!(sender_node, counterparty_node, sender_node_per_peer_lock, sender_node_peer_state_lock, temp_channel_id);
match channel_phase {
ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
let chan_context = channel_phase.context_mut();
chan_context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = 0;
chan_context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = 100_000_000;
},
_ => assert!(false),
}
}
let funding_tx = sign_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], 100_000, temp_channel_id);
let funding_msgs = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_tx);
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &funding_msgs.0);
// nodes[0] should now be able to send the full balance to nodes[1], violating nodes[1]'s
// security model if it ever tries to send funds back to nodes[0] (but that's not our problem).
if send_from_initiator {
send_payment(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 100_000_000
// Note that for outbound channels we have to consider the commitment tx fee and the
// "fee spike buffer", which is currently a multiple of the total commitment tx fee as
// well as an additional HTLC.
- FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw, 2, &channel_type_features));
} else {
send_payment(&nodes[1], &[&nodes[0]], push_amt);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_counterparty_no_reserve() {
do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(true);
do_test_counterparty_no_reserve(false);
}
#[test]
fn test_async_inbound_update_fee() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
// balancing
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
// A B
// update_fee ->
// send (1) commitment_signed -.
// <- update_add_htlc/commitment_signed
// send (2) RAA (awaiting remote revoke) -.
// (1) commitment_signed is delivered ->
// .- send (3) RAA (awaiting remote revoke)
// (2) RAA is delivered ->
// .- send (4) commitment_signed
// <- (3) RAA is delivered
// send (5) commitment_signed -.
// <- (4) commitment_signed is delivered
// send (6) RAA -.
// (5) commitment_signed is delivered ->
// <- RAA
// (6) RAA is delivered ->
// First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock += 20;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
(update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
// ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let payment_event = {
let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
};
assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
// ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
let as_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// deliver(1), generate (3):
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
let bs_revoke_and_ack = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// nodes[1] is awaiting nodes[0] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (2)
let bs_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(bs_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
assert!(bs_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
assert!(bs_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
assert!(bs_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (4)
assert!(bs_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (4)
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_and_ack); // deliver (3)
let as_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(as_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
assert!(as_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
assert!(as_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
assert!(as_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty()); // (5)
assert!(as_update.update_fee.is_none()); // (5)
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (4)
let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// only (6) so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update.commitment_signed); // deliver (5)
let bs_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_2 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events_2.len(), 1);
match events_2[0] {
Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {}, // If we actually processed we'd receive the payment
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
}
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke); // deliver (6)
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_unordered_raa() {
// Just the intro to the previous test followed by an out-of-order RAA (which caused a
// crash in an earlier version of the update_fee patch)
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
// balancing
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
// First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock += 20;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
let update_msg = match events_0[0] { // (1)
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, .. }, .. } => {
update_fee.as_ref()
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
// ...but before it's delivered, nodes[1] starts to send a payment back to nodes[0]...
let (route, our_payment_hash, _, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 40000);
nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let payment_event = {
let mut events_1 = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_1.len(), 1);
SendEvent::from_event(events_1.remove(0))
};
assert_eq!(payment_event.node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(payment_event.msgs.len(), 1);
// ...now when the messages get delivered everyone should be happy
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg); // (2)
let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// nodes[0] is awaiting nodes[1] revoke_and_ack so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg); // deliver (2)
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// We can't continue, sadly, because our (1) now has a bogus signature
}
#[test]
fn test_multi_flight_update_fee() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
// A B
// update_fee/commitment_signed ->
// .- send (1) RAA and (2) commitment_signed
// update_fee (never committed) ->
// (3) update_fee ->
// We have to manually generate the above update_fee, it is allowed by the protocol but we
// don't track which updates correspond to which revoke_and_ack responses so we're in
// AwaitingRAA mode and will not generate the update_fee yet.
// <- (1) RAA delivered
// (3) is generated and send (4) CS -.
// Note that A cannot generate (4) prior to (1) being delivered as it otherwise doesn't
// know the per_commitment_point to use for it.
// <- (2) commitment_signed delivered
// revoke_and_ack ->
// B should send no response here
// (4) commitment_signed delivered ->
// <- RAA/commitment_signed delivered
// revoke_and_ack ->
// First nodes[0] generates an update_fee
let initial_feerate;
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
initial_feerate = *feerate_lock;
*feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 20;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
let (update_msg_1, commitment_signed_1) = match events_0[0] { // (1)
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed, .. }, .. } => {
(update_fee.as_ref().unwrap(), commitment_signed)
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
// Deliver first update_fee/commitment_signed pair, generating (1) and (2):
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg_1);
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed_1);
let (bs_revoke_msg, bs_commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// nodes[0] is awaiting a revoke from nodes[1] before it will create a new commitment
// transaction:
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock = initial_feerate + 40;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
// Create the (3) update_fee message that nodes[0] will generate before it does...
let mut update_msg_2 = msgs::UpdateFee {
channel_id: update_msg_1.channel_id.clone(),
feerate_per_kw: (initial_feerate + 30) as u32,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw = (initial_feerate + 40) as u32;
// Deliver (3)
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg_2);
// Deliver (1), generating (3) and (4)
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_revoke_msg);
let as_second_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
assert!(as_second_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(as_second_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(as_second_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
// Check that the update_fee newly generated matches what we delivered:
assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().channel_id, update_msg_2.channel_id);
assert_eq!(as_second_update.update_fee.as_ref().unwrap().feerate_per_kw, update_msg_2.feerate_per_kw);
// Deliver (2) commitment_signed
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_commitment_signed);
let as_revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_revoke_msg);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Delever (4)
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_update.commitment_signed);
let (bs_second_revoke, bs_second_commitment) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_revoke);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_commitment);
let as_second_revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_revoke);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
fn do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(steps: u8) {
// Previously, we had issues deserializing channels when we hadn't connected the first block
// after creation. To catch that and similar issues, we lean on the Node::drop impl to test
// serialization round-trips and simply do steps towards opening a channel and then drop the
// Node objects.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
if steps & 0b1000_0000 != 0{
let block = create_dummy_block(nodes[0].best_block_hash(), 42, Vec::new());
connect_block(&nodes[0], &block);
connect_block(&nodes[1], &block);
}
if steps & 0x0f == 0 { return; }
nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 10001, 42, None, None).unwrap();
let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
if steps & 0x0f == 1 { return; }
nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
if steps & 0x0f == 2 { return; }
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100000, 42);
if steps & 0x0f == 3 { return; }
nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
let funding_created = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
if steps & 0x0f == 4 { return; }
nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created);
{
let mut added_monitors = nodes[1].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
added_monitors.clear();
}
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
if steps & 0x0f == 5 { return; }
nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
{
let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(added_monitors[0].0, funding_output);
added_monitors.clear();
}
expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
let events_4 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events_4.len(), 0);
if steps & 0x0f == 6 { return; }
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_first(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx, 2);
if steps & 0x0f == 7 { return; }
confirm_transaction_at(&nodes[0], &tx, 2);
connect_blocks(&nodes[0], CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH);
create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm_second(&nodes[1], &nodes[0]);
expect_channel_ready_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
}
#[test]
fn test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens() {
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(0 | 0b1000_0000);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(1 | 0b1000_0000);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(2 | 0b1000_0000);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(3 | 0b1000_0000);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(4 | 0b1000_0000);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(5 | 0b1000_0000);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(6 | 0b1000_0000);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(7 | 0b1000_0000);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8);
do_test_sanity_on_in_flight_opens(8 | 0b1000_0000);
}
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_vanilla() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock += 25;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
(update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
}
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_that_funder_cannot_afford() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let channel_value = 5000;
let push_sats = 700;
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes_with_value(&nodes, 0, 1, channel_value, push_sats * 1000);
let channel_id = chan.2;
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
let default_config = UserConfig::default();
let bs_channel_reserve_sats = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value, &default_config);
let channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
// Calculate the maximum feerate that A can afford. Note that we don't send an update_fee
// CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER HTLCs before actually running out of local balance, so we
// calculate two different feerates here - the expected local limit as well as the expected
// remote limit.
let feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / (commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features) + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC)) as u32;
let non_buffer_feerate = ((channel_value - bs_channel_reserve_sats - push_sats) * 1000 / commitment_tx_base_weight(&channel_type_features)) as u32;
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock = feerate;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let update_msg = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_msg.update_fee.unwrap());
commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], update_msg.commitment_signed, false);
// Confirm that the new fee based on the last local commitment txn is what we expected based on the feerate set above.
{
let commitment_tx = get_local_commitment_txn!(nodes[1], channel_id)[0].clone();
//We made sure neither party's funds are below the dust limit and there are no HTLCs here
assert_eq!(commitment_tx.output.len(), 2);
let total_fee: u64 = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000;
let mut actual_fee = commitment_tx.output.iter().fold(0, |acc, output| acc + output.value);
actual_fee = channel_value - actual_fee;
assert_eq!(total_fee, actual_fee);
}
{
// Increment the feerate by a small constant, accounting for rounding errors
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock += 4;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
nodes[0].logger.assert_log("lightning::ln::channel", format!("Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate + 4), 1);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 0);
const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = 281474976710654;
// Get the TestChannelSigner for each channel, which will be used to (1) get the keys
// needed to sign the new commitment tx and (2) sign the new commitment tx.
let (local_revocation_basepoint, local_htlc_basepoint, local_funding) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let local_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
).flatten().unwrap();
let chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
(pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
};
let (remote_delayed_payment_basepoint, remote_htlc_basepoint,remote_point, remote_funding) = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[1].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let remote_chan = chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
).flatten().unwrap();
let chan_signer = remote_chan.get_signer();
let pubkeys = chan_signer.as_ref().pubkeys();
(pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, pubkeys.htlc_basepoint,
chan_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &secp_ctx),
pubkeys.funding_pubkey)
};
// Assemble the set of keys we can use for signatures for our commitment_signed message.
let commit_tx_keys = chan_utils::TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &remote_point, &remote_delayed_payment_basepoint,
&remote_htlc_basepoint, &local_revocation_basepoint, &local_htlc_basepoint);
let res = {
let per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
let local_chan_lock = per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap().lock().unwrap();
let local_chan = local_chan_lock.channel_by_id.get(&chan.2).map(
|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
).flatten().unwrap();
let local_chan_signer = local_chan.get_signer();
let mut htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, ())> = vec![];
let commitment_tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1,
push_sats,
channel_value - push_sats - commit_tx_fee_msat(non_buffer_feerate + 4, 0, &channel_type_features) / 1000,
local_funding, remote_funding,
commit_tx_keys.clone(),
non_buffer_feerate + 4,
&mut htlcs,
&local_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable()
);
local_chan_signer.as_ecdsa().unwrap().sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &secp_ctx).unwrap()
};
let commit_signed_msg = msgs::CommitmentSigned {
channel_id: chan.2,
signature: res.0,
htlc_signatures: res.1,
#[cfg(taproot)]
partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
};
let update_fee = msgs::UpdateFee {
channel_id: chan.2,
feerate_per_kw: non_buffer_feerate + 4,
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &update_fee);
//While producing the commitment_signed response after handling a received update_fee request the
//check to see if the funder, who sent the update_fee request, can afford the new fee (funder_balance >= fee+channel_reserve)
//Should produce and error.
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commit_signed_msg);
nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee", 3);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[1], true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: String::from("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee") },
[nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], channel_value);
}
#[test]
fn test_update_fee_with_fundee_update_add_htlc() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let mut nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
// balancing
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 8000000);
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock += 20;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
(update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let (route, our_payment_hash, our_payment_preimage, our_payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(nodes[1], nodes[0], 800000);
// nothing happens since node[1] is in AwaitingRemoteRevoke
nodes[1].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, our_payment_hash,
RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(our_payment_secret), PaymentId(our_payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
{
let mut added_monitors = nodes[0].chain_monitor.added_monitors.lock().unwrap();
assert_eq!(added_monitors.len(), 0);
added_monitors.clear();
}
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
// node[1] has nothing to do
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// AwaitingRemoteRevoke ends here
let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), 0);
assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 0);
assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(), 0);
assert_eq!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none(), true);
nodes[0].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.update_add_htlcs[0]);
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let (revoke, commitment_signed) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
let revoke = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
match events[0] {
Event::PaymentClaimable { .. } => { },
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
claim_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], our_payment_preimage);
send_payment(&nodes[1], &vec!(&nodes[0])[..], 800000);
send_payment(&nodes[0], &vec!(&nodes[1])[..], 800000);
close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
#[test]
fn test_update_fee() {
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let channel_id = chan.2;
// A B
// (1) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
// <- (2) revoke_and_ack
// .- send (3) commitment_signed
// (4) update_fee/commitment_signed ->
// .- send (5) revoke_and_ack (no CS as we're awaiting a revoke)
// <- (3) commitment_signed delivered
// send (6) revoke_and_ack -.
// <- (5) deliver revoke_and_ack
// (6) deliver revoke_and_ack ->
// .- send (7) commitment_signed in response to (4)
// <- (7) deliver commitment_signed
// revoke_and_ack ->
// Create and deliver (1)...
let feerate;
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
feerate = *feerate_lock;
*feerate_lock = feerate + 20;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
(update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
// Generate (2) and (3):
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
let (revoke_msg, commitment_signed_0) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Deliver (2):
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// Create and deliver (4)...
{
let mut feerate_lock = chanmon_cfgs[0].fee_estimator.sat_per_kw.lock().unwrap();
*feerate_lock = feerate + 30;
}
nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let events_0 = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
assert_eq!(events_0.len(), 1);
let (update_msg, commitment_signed) = match events_0[0] {
MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id:_, updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate { update_add_htlcs:_, update_fulfill_htlcs:_, update_fail_htlcs:_, update_fail_malformed_htlcs:_, ref update_fee, ref commitment_signed } } => {
(update_fee.as_ref(), commitment_signed)
},
_ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
};
nodes[1].node.handle_update_fee(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), update_msg.unwrap());
nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), commitment_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// ... creating (5)
let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
// No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
// Handle (3), creating (6):
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_signed_0);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let revoke_msg_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
// Deliver (5):
nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
// Deliver (6), creating (7):
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg_0);
let commitment_update = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
assert!(commitment_update.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(commitment_update.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
assert!(commitment_update.update_fee.is_none());
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
// Deliver (7)
nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &commitment_update.commitment_signed);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
let revoke_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
// No commitment_signed so get_event_msg's assert(len == 1) passes
nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &revoke_msg);
check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[0], nodes[1], channel_id), feerate + 30);
assert_eq!(get_feerate!(nodes[1], nodes[0], channel_id), feerate + 30);
close_channel(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &chan.2, chan.3, true);
check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
}
#[test]
fn fake_network_test() {
// Simple test which builds a network of ChannelManagers, connects them to each other, and
// tests that payments get routed and transactions broadcast in semi-reasonable ways.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
// Create some initial channels
let chan_1 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
let chan_2 = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 2);