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| 1 | +--- |
| 2 | +title: "Building a secure platform" |
| 3 | +description: "Strengthening Supply Chain Security on Nais" |
| 4 | +date: 2024-12-08T14:12:01+02:00 |
| 5 | +draft: false |
| 6 | +author: Youssef Bel Mekki |
| 7 | +tags: [ slsa, security, supplychain, vulnerabilities ] |
| 8 | +language: en |
| 9 | +--- |
| 10 | + |
| 11 | + |
| 12 | + |
| 13 | +The [Nais](https://docs.nais.io/) platform supports over 1,700 applications, ranging from simple web pages to complex |
| 14 | +data processing systems, built by more than 250 teams. These teams differ in size and focus—some prioritize security, |
| 15 | +while others emphasize speed and agility. |
| 16 | + |
| 17 | +Our goal is to ensure every application on the platform is both secure and reliable. This means giving teams the tools |
| 18 | +they need to identify and fix vulnerabilities quickly and efficiently. |
| 19 | + |
| 20 | +## The Nais golden path |
| 21 | + |
| 22 | +There are many ways for a malicious actor to compromise an application, even before the code is committed. From A to H, |
| 23 | +there are numerous potential vulnerabilities that we must be aware of and proactively address. |
| 24 | + |
| 25 | + |
| 26 | +[slsa-threats-overview](https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/threats-overview) |
| 27 | + |
| 28 | +By collaborating with our AppSec team, we work to identify the most common methods attackers use to compromise code and |
| 29 | +implement measures to prevent them. |
| 30 | + |
| 31 | + |
| 32 | + |
| 33 | +### Secure by design |
| 34 | + |
| 35 | +To achieve this, we secure every layer of the platform infrastructure. This includes enforcing security policies across |
| 36 | +clusters and namespaces with tools like network policies with egress control, pod security policies, and RBAC. Hardened |
| 37 | +container images provide a secure foundation, and tools like [TokenX](https://docs.nais.io/auth/tokenx/), |
| 38 | +which facilitates secure token exchange between applications for maintaining strict access control, strengthen |
| 39 | +application-level security. |
| 40 | + |
| 41 | +We also introduced [Texas](https://docs.nais.io/auth/explanations/?h=texas#texas), which stands for Token Exchange as a |
| 42 | +Service. It simplifies the process of working with OAuth 2.0 and JWTs, handling the complexities of user authentication |
| 43 | +and authorization so our teams doesn’t have to, following |
| 44 | +`The Nais golden path`. |
| 45 | + |
| 46 | +## From concept to implementation |
| 47 | + |
| 48 | +It all started with an idea from my colleague Tommy: What if we could sign container images before pushing them to a |
| 49 | +registry and then scan them for vulnerabilities? The results could be displayed in an intuitive interface, making it |
| 50 | +easier for teams to take action. It might not have been exactly like that, but that’s how I remember it. |
| 51 | + |
| 52 | +In June 2021, Google introduced the [SLSA](https://slsa.dev/) (Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts) framework. |
| 53 | +Inspired by this, we focused on three key goals: |
| 54 | + |
| 55 | +* Automated Image Signing: Automatically sign container images in the CI/CD pipeline. |
| 56 | +* Vulnerability Scanning: Scan the Software Bill of Materials ([SBOM](https://www.cisa.gov/sbom)) to detect |
| 57 | + vulnerabilities. |
| 58 | +* Searchable Vulnerability Visibility: Enable teams to easily find and view vulnerabilities in their applications. |
| 59 | + |
| 60 | +## The journey |
| 61 | + |
| 62 | +### Early challenges and solutions |
| 63 | + |
| 64 | +Our dependency tracking journey began in December 2021. We aimed to automate every step from code commit to deployment, |
| 65 | +giving teams detailed insights into their applications' vulnerabilities and dependencies. |
| 66 | + |
| 67 | +This approach gained urgency with the discovery of the Log4Shell vulnerability in November 2021. Initially, we relied on |
| 68 | +scripts to locate affected workloads. For example, [Terje](https://github.com/terjesannum/scan-log4j) proposed scanning |
| 69 | +container filesystems for vulnerable Log4j |
| 70 | +JAR files. While effective, we recognized the need for proactive solutions. |
| 71 | + |
| 72 | +### Tool integration and custom Solutions |
| 73 | + |
| 74 | +We started with a simple goal: detect an application’s programming language, generate an SBOM, and securely sign both |
| 75 | +the SBOM and the container image before uploading them to the registry. Signing was challenging, |
| 76 | +but [Cosign](https://www.sigstore.dev/) from Sigstore (released in 2021) proved to be a perfect fit due to its |
| 77 | +simplicity and reliability. |
| 78 | + |
| 79 | +By October 2021, Trivy introduced SBOM generation for container images. This allowed us to shift focus to other |
| 80 | +priorities. We integrated [Trivy](https://trivy.dev/latest/) for both vulnerability scanning and SBOM generation, |
| 81 | +accelerating our progress. |
| 82 | + |
| 83 | +To visualize vulnerabilities, we turned to the [OWASP Dependency-Track](https://dependencytrack.org/) project. Using its |
| 84 | +REST API, we populated data and built a custom visualization in the Nais Console. This interface focuses on active |
| 85 | +workloads in clusters and their vulnerabilities. |
| 86 | + |
| 87 | +### Custom cluster monitoring: Slsa-verde |
| 88 | + |
| 89 | +To further enhance security, we developed slsa-verde, a Kubernetes cluster monitor inspired by the SLSA framework. Its |
| 90 | +key responsibilities include: |
| 91 | + |
| 92 | +* Monitoring Workloads: Actively tracks container images used in Kubernetes clusters. |
| 93 | +* Verifying Image Attestations: Ensures images are signed by trusted entities. |
| 94 | +* Integrating with Dependency-Track: Extracts SBOMs from images, submits them for analysis. |
| 95 | +* Data Synchronization: Maintains real-time records of active images and aligns them with Kubernetes applications. |
| 96 | + |
| 97 | +This tool ensures that vulnerability data is accurate, up-to-date, and actionable, helping teams respond quickly to |
| 98 | +potential threats. |
| 99 | + |
| 100 | +### Details |
| 101 | + |
| 102 | + |
| 103 | + |
| 104 | +* Nais developers push their code to GitHub. |
| 105 | +* A [Nais action](https://github.com/nais/docker-build-push) builds the code, creates an SBOM, and signs the container |
| 106 | + image. |
| 107 | +* The attestation can be tracked in the [Rekor transparency log](https://docs.sigstore.dev/logging/overview/). |
| 108 | +* The container image and SBOM are uploaded to the container registry. |
| 109 | +* The workload is deployed to the Nais platform. |
| 110 | +* SLSA-verde watches for new workloads in the cluster. |
| 111 | +* SLSA-verde verifies the image signature, checks its source, and extracts the SBOM. |
| 112 | +* SLSA-verde sends the SBOM to Dependency-Track for analysis. |
| 113 | + |
| 114 | +Developers can view vulnerabilities directly in the Nais Console. The entire process, from pushing code to seeing |
| 115 | +vulnerability insights, takes only a few minutes, depending on the size of the image and the actions performed. |
| 116 | + |
| 117 | +## Nais to have |
| 118 | + |
| 119 | +* Visualize historical data to monitor vulnerabilities over time. |
| 120 | + |
| 121 | + |
| 122 | +* Track data from the commit where the vulnerability was introduced. |
| 123 | + * Record when the vulnerability was fixed. |
| 124 | + * Measure lead time for resolving vulnerabilities. |
| 125 | + * Track when the vulnerability was first deployed. |
| 126 | + |
| 127 | + |
| 128 | +* Provide alerts and notifications management in the Nais Console. |
| 129 | + * Enable filtering of alerts by cluster and severity. |
| 130 | + * Deliver alerts to preferred channels (e.g., Slack, email, etc.). |
| 131 | + |
| 132 | +## Next step |
| 133 | + |
| 134 | +Increase awareness among teams about vulnerabilities in their applications with real-time insights. |
| 135 | +This is not always so simple due to a large number of applications and teams, in a medium-sized organization. |
| 136 | +We are working on improving our communication channels to ensure that teams are aware of the vulnerabilities in their |
| 137 | +applications and is proactive in addressing them. To achieve this, we plan to: |
| 138 | + |
| 139 | +* Require all applications to include an SBOM. |
| 140 | +* Block deployments of images without an SBOM. |
| 141 | +* Provide teams with [more tools](#nais-to-have) to prepare for the next zero-day. |
| 142 | +* Enforce stricter deployment restrictions for applications with critical vulnerabilities. |
| 143 | + |
| 144 | +## Conclusion |
| 145 | + |
| 146 | +Building a secure platform that supports over 1,700 applications across 250 teams is a complex and ongoing challenge. At |
| 147 | +Nais, we work to ensure every application is secure and reliable by giving teams the tools they need to quickly find and |
| 148 | +fix vulnerabilities. |
| 149 | + |
| 150 | +From the start, we’ve focused on securing every layer of our platform. Tools like TokenX and Texas make token exchanges |
| 151 | +and authentication easier, while frameworks like SLSA help us automate key processes like image signing, SBOM |
| 152 | +generation, and vulnerability scanning to secure the software supply chain. |
| 153 | + |
| 154 | +Using tools like Trivy and OWASP Dependency-Track, we’ve improved visibility into vulnerabilities and dependencies. |
| 155 | +Custom solutions like slsa-verde strengthen security by monitoring Kubernetes clusters, verifying images, and keeping |
| 156 | +vulnerability data accurate and actionable. |
| 157 | + |
| 158 | +As new threats emerge, we continue to adapt. By working with our AppSec team, we identify common risks and take steps to |
| 159 | +prevent them. Next, we plan to require SBOMs for all applications, block deployments without them, and enforce stricter |
| 160 | +controls for critical vulnerabilities. We’re also improving communication and real-time alerts to help teams respond |
| 161 | +quickly to threats. |
| 162 | + |
| 163 | +Our goal is simple: to create a secure, reliable platform that helps teams build better applications while staying ahead |
| 164 | +of potential risks. |
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