Add PreAuthType filter to PetitPotam Kerberos TGT detection (#4146)

---------

Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <nbencher@cisco.com>

Author: munzzyy

detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml

@@ -1,27 +1,36 @@
 name: PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request
 id: e3ef244e-0a67-11ec-abf2-acde48001122
-version: 10
+version: 11
 creation_date: '2021-09-01'
-modification_date: '2026-05-13'
+modification_date: '2026-07-04'
 author: Michael Haag, Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
 status: production
 type: TTP
 description: The following analytic detects a suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) request, identified by Event Code 4768. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs to identify TGT requests with unusual fields, which may indicate the use of tools like Rubeus following the exploitation of CVE-2021-36942 (PetitPotam). This activity is significant as it can signal an attacker leveraging a compromised certificate to request Kerberos tickets, potentially leading to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to escalate privileges and persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
 data_source:
     - Windows Event Log Security 4768
 search: |-
-    `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4768 src!="::1" TargetUserName=*$ CertThumbprint!=""
-      | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
-        BY dest, TargetUserName, src,
-           action
-      | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
-      | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
-      | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`
-how_to_implement: The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk.
-known_false_positives: False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication.
+    `wineventlog_security`
+    EventCode=4768
+    src!="::1"
+    TargetUserName=*$
+    CertThumbprint!=""
+    PreAuthType=2
+    | stats count min(_time) as firstTime
+                  max(_time) as lastTime
+      BY dest TargetUserName PreAuthType CertThumbprint src action
+    | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
+    | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
+    | `petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request_filter`
+how_to_implement: |-
+    The following analytic requires Event Code 4768. Ensure that it is logging no Domain Controllers and appearing in Splunk.
+known_false_positives: |-
+    False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication, since PreAuthType 2 can appear on some initial or fallback authentication flows alongside a populated certificate field.
+    Tune further based on observed authentication patterns in the environment.
 references:
     - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventid=4768
     - https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/
+    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4768#kerberos-preauthentication-types
 drilldown_searches:
     - name: View the detection results for - "$dest$"
       search: '%original_detection_search% | search  dest = "$dest$"'