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---
title: "Problems with Self-verification"
author: "unknown"
tags: ["library"]
type: "essay"
---
{% raw %}
Problems with Self-verification
Open sidebar
Problems with Self-verification
Model: Default (GPT-3.5)
Summarize: AARON Z. ZIMMERMAN
SELF-VERIFICATION AND THE CONTENT OF THOUGHT1
Descartes famously argued, on purely conceptual grounds, that even
an extremely powerful being could not trick him into mistakenly
judging that he was thinking. Of course, it is not necessarily true that
Descartes is thinking. Still, Descartes claimed, it is necessarily true
that if a person judges that she is thinking, that person is thinking.
Following Tyler B?rge (1988) we call such judgments 'self-verifying.'
More exactly, a judgment j performed by a subject S at a time t is self
verifying if and only if the fact that S has made j at t entails that j is
true at t? B?rge follows Descartes in claiming that the category of
conceptually self-verifying judgments includes (but is not restricted
to) judgments that give rise to sincere assertions of sentences of the
form, T am thinking that p\ We call such judgments 'cogito' judg
ments.
In this paper I argue that Burge's Cartesian insight is hard to
reconcile with Fregean accounts of the content of thought. Theorists
have tried to account for the self-verifying status of cogito judgments
by arguing that the second-order judgment that one is thinking that p
contains the thought that p as a part of it. I argue (?1) that the
accuracy of the containment model is entailed by a Russellian view of
content (according to which "belief contexts are both extensional
and transparent) when the Russellian view is attached to some fairly
uncontroversial assumptions. The accuracy of the containment model
is also entailed by non-hierarchical Fregean views of content
according to which expressions in oblique contexts both denote and
express first-level senses (?2), but there are compelling arguments
against non-hierarchical Fregean views (?3). Moreover, the extremely
plausible account of self-verification provided by Russellianism is not
entailed by theories that follow Frege in accepting a hierarchy of
senses and so allow that expressions in oblique contexts express
senses that are not identical to the senses they there denote (?4). If
these arguments are sound, Fregeans must accept the hierarchy of
senses, and to accept the hierarchy they must substantially augment
their view to account for self-verification. I go on to explain how a
Fodorian account of senses might try to take up this challenge, but I
Synthese (2006) 149: 59-75
DOI 10.1007/sll229-004-6247-x
? Springer 2006
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60 AARON Z. ZIMMERMAN
show that the Fodorian solution must posit conceptually necessary
connections between distinct concreta (?5). Finally (?6) I consider
Alonzo Church's (1974) description of 'standard' higher-level senses
and show why some notion of this kind must be invoked by the
Fregean to account for self-verification. But the mere existence of
standard higher-level senses is not up to the task, even if we follow
Church in positing logical relations between standard senses and the
lower-level senses they determine. Fregeans must go further than
Church and claim that standard higher-level senses have a particular
composite structure. It seems, then, that Burge's intuitively show that the Fodorian solution must posit conceptually necessary
connections between distinct concreta (?5). Finally (?6) I consider
Alonzo Church's (1974) description of 'standard' higher-level senses
and show why some notion of this kind must be invoked by the
Fregean to account for self-verification. But the mere existence of
standard higher-level senses is not up to the task, even if we follow
Church in positing logical relations between standard senses and the
lower-level senses they determine. Fregeans must go further than
Church and claim that standard higher-level senses have a particular
composite structure. It seems, then, that Burge's intuitively compel
ling claim that cogito judgments are conceptually self-verifying poses
a real challenge to neo-Fregean theories of content.
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In this paper, Aaron Z. Zimmerman discusses the concept of self-verifying judgments, specifically focusing on cogito judgments that involve the thought "I am thinking that p." Zimmerman argues against Fregean accounts of the content of thought in reconciling with the self-verifying status of cogito judgments. He examines the containment model, which suggests that the judgment that one is thinking that p contains the thought that p as a part of it. Zimmerman contends that this model is supported by Russellian views of content and non-hierarchical Fregean views, but there are compelling arguments against the latter. He also explains that the Russellian account of self-verification is not entailed by theories that accept a hierarchy of senses. Zimmerman explores the possibility of a Fodorian account of senses to address the challenge, but notes that it requires positing conceptually necessary connections between distinct concreta. Additionally, he considers Alonzo Church's description of "standard" higher-level senses but asserts that the mere existence of these senses is insufficient to account for self-verification. Fregeans must claim that standard higher-level senses have a particular composite structure to adequately address the challenge posed by self-verifying judgments. Overall, Zimmerman suggests that Burge's claim regarding the self-verifying nature of cogito judgments presents a significant challenge to neo-Fregean theories of content.
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2. AN ATTEMPT AT A FREGEAN ACCOUNT OF SELF-VERIFICATION
How might a Fregean argue for the self-verifying status of a sub
ject's judgment that she is thinking that pi On the Fregean view,
the first-order thought that John is nice is a relation between a
subject and a proposition where the proposition is constituted by a
sense or mode of presentation (MOP) determining John and an
MOP determining niceness. Let a range over natural language
expressions, and let '{a}' denote the sense of a. We then represent
the purportedly Fregean content of the thought that John is nice as
({John}, {niceness}), where '{John}' denotes the MOP expressed
by the English expression 'John', '{niceness}' denotes the MOP
expressed by 'nice', and '({John}, {niceness})' denotes the propo
sition that John is nice.5 According to the Fregean, then, in
thinking that John is nice, S is related by thought to ({John},
{niceness}).
What, though, is the content of S"s introspective judgment that
she is thinking that John is nice? If we accept premise (4) then 5"s
second-order judgment that she is thinking that John is nice is in part
constituted out of the very MOPs that constitute her first-order
thought: {John} and {niceness}. We might take this to suggest that
5"s higher-order judgment is not constituted by a second-level MOP
determining the first-level MOP expressed by 'John' (nor an MOP
determining the MOP expressed by 'nice'). The content of 5"s judg
ment that she is thinking that John is nice would then be ({/},
{thinking}, ({John}, {niceness})). If premise (1) is right, then to judge
true ({/}, {thinking}, ({John}, {niceness})), S must consider or
entertain ({/}, {thinking}, ({John}, {niceness})). If premise (2) is
correct, then in considering ({/}, {thinking}, ({John}, {niceness})), S
must consider its constituents, one of which is ({John}, {niceness}).
Finally, if premise (3) is correct, in considering ({John}, {niceness}), S
is thinking ({John}, {niceness}). Thus, if S judges that she is thinking
that John is nice, she is thinking that John is nice.
Christopher Peacocke (1999) explicitly adopts this account of self
verification. He accepts a Fregean account of content, and his
'redeployment claim' states that when an expression occurs in an
embedded context it denotes the very MOP it there expresses:
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A Fregean account of self-verification involves examining the content of a subject's judgment that they are thinking that p. According to this view, the first-order thought, such as "John is nice," involves a relation between a subject and a proposition. The proposition is constituted by senses or modes of presentation (MOP) that determine the individual referred to (e.g., John) and the property expressed (e.g., niceness). Representing the content of the thought as ({John}, {niceness}), where '{John}' and '{niceness}' denote the respective MOPs, captures the Fregean perspective.
However, the challenge arises in determining the content of the subject's introspective judgment that they are thinking that John is nice. If we accept the premise that the second-order judgment is partly constituted by the very MOPs that constitute the first-order thought ({John}, {niceness}), then the content of the higher-order judgment would be ({/}, {thinking}, ({John}, {niceness})). According to premises (1), (2), and (3), if the subject judges this higher-order proposition as true, they must consider or entertain it, including its constituents. Therefore, if the subject judges that they are thinking that John is nice, they are indeed thinking that John is nice.
Christopher Peacocke, in his work, endorses this account of self-verification and explicitly adopts the Fregean perspective on content. His "redeployment claim" asserts that when an expression occurs in an embedded context, it denotes the same MOP it expresses in that context.
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theory of content entails that cogito
judgments are self-verifying. The Fregean's explanatory position is
drastically different. Because the Fregean must accept a hierarchy of
senses, her theory is incompatible with (4), and in the absence of
augmentation the Fregean theory does not entail (4'). Indeed, unless
she explicitly adds Church's theorem and posits standard higher-level
senses with the requisite internal structure there is nothing about the
Fregean's theory of content that even argues in favor of (4').
7. CONCLUSION
It seems then that the conceptually self-verifying nature of cogito
judgments places serious constraints on our theory of thought
content. Indeed, the tension goes beyond the writings of those who
mistakenly endorse a non-hierarchical view of MOPs. The 'con
tainment model' of the relation between first- and second-order
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72 AARON Z. ZIMMERMAN
content has become a standard reply to arguments for the incom
patibility of content externalism and privileged introspective ac
cess,17 while Frege-inspired accounts of thought-content remain
extremely popular. Insofar, as the arguments presented here are
cogent, these two positions are difficult to reconcile. To retain the
Cartesian (conceptual) explanation for why a thinker cannot judge
falsely that she is thinking a particular thought, the Fregean must
claim that only some of the (potentially infinite) higher-level MOPs
that determine a single lower-level MOP are standard. And she
must move beyond current formulations of Fregeanism to explain
why the fact that one is grasping a standard higher-level MOP
entails that one is concurrently grasping the lower-level MOP for
which it is standard.
Of course, the Fregean who rejects (4') might nevertheless posit an
intimate (perhaps causal) relation between the content of the thought
that p and the content of the introspective judgment that one is
thinking that/?. But if neither (4) nor (4') is correct, cogito judgments
are not conceptually self-verifying.
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In conclusion, the self-verifying nature of cogito judgments poses significant constraints on our theory of thought content. The Fregean theory of content, with its hierarchical view of senses, is incompatible with the claim that the second-order judgment is constituted by the same MOPs as the first-order thought. Without explicit augmentation, the Fregean theory does not entail the self-verifying status of cogito judgments. This tension extends beyond those who mistakenly endorse a non-hierarchical view of MOPs. The containment model, which is often used to reconcile content externalism and introspective access, and Frege-inspired accounts of thought content are difficult to reconcile in light of the arguments presented. To maintain the Cartesian explanation for why a thinker cannot falsely judge their own thinking, the Fregean must argue that only some higher-level MOPs are standard and provide an explanation for why grasping a standard higher-level MOP entails grasping the corresponding lower-level MOP. Without accepting certain premises, cogito judgments are not conceptually self-verifying.
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Ok simplify it more
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The self-verifying nature of cogito judgments, where a person judges that they are thinking something, poses challenges for theories of thought content. The Fregean theory, which involves a hierarchy of senses, is incompatible with the idea that the higher-order judgment includes the same senses as the lower-order thought. Without additional adjustments, the Fregean theory doesn't support the self-verifying status of cogito judgments. This creates tension between the popular containment model and Frege-inspired accounts of thought content. To maintain the Cartesian explanation that a thinker cannot falsely judge their own thinking, the Fregean must argue that only certain higher-level senses are standard and explain why grasping a standard higher-level sense also entails grasping the corresponding lower-level sense. Without accepting specific premises, cogito judgments are not conceptually self-verifying.
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What does that mean?
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In simpler terms, the concept of self-verifying judgments, particularly cogito judgments where a person judges that they are thinking something, presents a challenge for theories about the content of our thoughts. One popular theory, called the Fregean theory, suggests that thoughts consist of different levels of meanings or senses. However, this theory clashes with the idea that higher-order judgments include the same senses as lower-order thoughts. Without making some adjustments, the Fregean theory cannot explain the self-verifying nature of cogito judgments. This creates a conflict between the widely accepted containment model and theories inspired by Frege. To uphold the idea that a thinker cannot mistakenly judge their own thinking, Fregean theorists must argue that only specific higher-level senses are considered standard and provide an explanation for how grasping a standard higher-level sense implies grasping the corresponding lower-level sense. Without accepting certain ideas, cogito judgments are not inherently self-verifying.
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5 I here make the (surely false) simplifying assumption that 'John' has a single
customary MOP. This will not affect what follows.
6 I here define hierarchical views as those that accept at least two levels of senses. (On
my terminology, theorists who have tried to limit the hierarchy to exactly two levels
have nevertheless admitted a hierarchy.) Peacocke is not alone in adopting a non
hierarchical version of Frege's theory of content. As he points out, Carnap (1947, p.
129) and Dummett (1973, pp. 267-269, 1981, pp. 83-147) endorse the view as well.
7 The argument below owes a great deal to Nathan Salmon's discussion in 'On
Designating', of the famous Gray's 'Elegy . . .' passage in Russell's 'On Denoting'.
Compare with Blackburn and Code (1978). I should also make it clear that the
argument that follows is not a general refutation of the redeployment claim. Instead,
it shows that the redeployment claim is incompatible with a Fregean account of
content.
8 The non-hierarchical Fregean might object to this assumption. (Peacocke would
not, as he employs the same '{}' notation to denote senses that we employ above.)
But, first, it is hard to see why we should believe in the existence of entities we cannot
simply denote; and, second, this view is not available to neo-Fregeans- like B?rge-
who wish to make substantive claims about particular concepts (e.g., {arthritis}). Cf.
Church, 'The hierarchy of concepts of successively higher orders arises as soon as we
suppose that a concept, like anything else that can be discussed at all, is capable of
having a name given to it' (1951, p. 12, n. 13).
9 This must be Dummett's view as he admits that if embedded expressions express the
very senses they denote, the sense of 'Aristotle' in oratio obliqua cannot also be
equated with the ordinary sense of the phrase 'the sense of'Aristotle" (1981: 89). If
there are senses, 'the sense of 'Aristotle" clearly has a sense; if this sense is not the
sense of 'Aristotle' it must be a second-level sense that determines the sense of
'Aristotle'. So Dummett must allow that there is a hierarchy, even if only its first
level members enter into the contents of higher-order thoughts.
10 B?rge says, "Believes' originally applied to person and propositions. But on our
assumptions it has come to apply to persons and truth-values' (1979, p. 272).
1 x For the claim that the truth-value of a sentence is a function of the denotations of
its parts see Frege (1980, p. 59).
12 We here make no assumptions about the semantic value of 'that' when it is
attached to sub-sentential expressions and so functions as a demonstrative. To be
fair, one might think that even when 'that' is attached to a sentence it functions as a
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74 AARON Z. ZIMMERMAN
demonstrative. That is, one might think that in such contexts, 'that' expresses a
demonstrative sense determining the proposition expressed by the sentence that
follows it. I don't think this view is plausible, but it can be ignored in the present
context because it requires positing second-level senses in oblique contexts (i.e.,
demonstrative MOPs that are distinct from the propositional MOPs they determine)
and so cannot be adopted by a non-hierarchical Fregean. There is also Davidson's
(1968-1969) view that tokens of 'that' demonstrate (or are used to demonstrate) the
token utterances they precede. Davidson's view is unacceptable to hierarchical and
non-hierarchical Fregeans alike.
13 {John} is one of the potentially infinite MOPs that determine John and it is the
customary MOP expressed by the English expression 'John'. {The only first-level
subject-determining MOP denoted by an expression in this paragraph} is one of the
potentially infinite MOPs that determine the only first-level subject-determining
MOP denoted by an expression in this paragraph- i.e., {John}- and it is the
customary MOP expressed by the somewhat technical English expression 'the only
first-level subject-determining MOP denoted by an expression in this paragraph'.
14 See Armstrong (1963).
15 Cf. Carnap, 'since [Frege] assumes that nominatum and sense must always be
different, he had thus to introduce a third entity as the oblique sense. Incidentally, it
seems that Frege nowhere explains in more customary terms what this third entity is'
(1949, p. 129).
16 See Fodor (1998) and Fodor et al. (1999).
17 Among the prominent advocates of the containment model are Heil (1988) and
Shoemaker (1996).
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The assumption made here is that 'John' has a single customary meaning, although this simplification doesn't affect the subsequent arguments.
Hierarchical views refer to theories that accept multiple levels of senses, and even theorists like Peacocke, Carnap, and Dummett have adopted non-hierarchical versions of Frege's theory of content.
The arguments presented are influenced by Nathan Salmon's discussion on Russell's 'On Denoting' and Blackburn and Code's work, but they do not serve as a general refutation of the redeployment claim. Instead, they show that the redeployment claim is incompatible with a Fregean account of content.
The assumption made is that we should believe in the existence of entities that can be denoted, and this view is not available to neo-Fregeans like B��rge.
Dummett's view suggests the existence of a hierarchy, even if only the first-level members of the hierarchy enter into the contents of higher-order thoughts.
B��rge states that the term "believes" originally applied to persons and propositions but has now come to apply to persons and truth-values.
The claim is made that the truth-value of a sentence is a function of the denotations of its parts, as stated by Frege.
The semantic value of 'that' when attached to sub-sentential expressions and functioning as a demonstrative is not assumed here. It is disregarded because it requires positing second-level senses in oblique contexts, which is not compatible with a non-hierarchical Fregean view.
Davidson's view that tokens of 'that' demonstrate the token utterances they precede is unacceptable to both hierarchical and non-hierarchical Fregeans.
{John} represents one of the potentially infinite senses that determine John and is the customary sense expressed by the term 'John'.
Armstrong's work is relevant in this context.
Carnap points out that Frege introduced a third entity, the oblique sense, because he assumed that the nominatum and sense must always be different but didn't explain it in more customary terms.
References are made to Fodor's work on the subject.
Prominent advocates of the containment model include Heil and Shoemaker.
These additional points provide further clarification and references related to the arguments presented in the text.
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4. A HIERARCHICAL REJECTION OF CONCEPTUAL SELF-VERIFICATION
It seems then that the Fregean is committed to a hierarchy of thought
contents; but it is equally clear that hierarchical views are at least
consistent with a rejection of the self-verifying nature of cogito
judgments. Suppose the hierarchy exists and let {{John}} be one of
several second-level MOPs determining the first-level MOP {John}. If
judgment entails consideration and considering a proposition entails
considering its constituents, the fact that S has judged ({S}, {think
ing}, ({{John}}, {{niceness}})) entails that she has considered
({{John}}, {{niceness}}), but given only classical logic it does not
entail that she has considered {{John}, {niceness}).
Indeed, it would be intuitively false to suppose that thinking a
second-level sense requires thinking the first-level sense it determines.
Both {{John}} and {the only first-level subject-determining MOP
denoted by an expression in this paragraph} determine {John}, but,
intuitively, a subject can consider the second-level MOP {the only
first-level subject-determining MOP denoted by an expression in this
paragraph} without therein considering the first-level MOP {John}.13
So S might be related by judgment to ({S}, {thinking}, ({the only
first-level subject-determining MOP denoted by an expression in this
paragraph}, {{niceness}})) without being related by thought to
({John}, {niceness}).
5. A FODORIAN ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE THE HIERARCHY WITH
CONCEPTUAL SELF-VERIFICATION
Though the existence of the hierarchy appears to permit the possi
bility of false cogito judgments, one might hope to use substantive
metaphysical claims about the nature of MOPs to dispel these
appearances. To see how this might be done, suppose with Jerry
Fodor (1998) that MOPs are types of Language of Thought (LOT)
inscription. Whether Lois uses 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman' she always
refers to the same man, but the MOP deployed when she uses
'Superman' is the LOT expression 'SUPERMAN', while the MOP
deployed with 'Clark Kent' is 'CLARK KENT' in the LOT. Suppose
too, in accordance with this psychologistic account of senses, that 'R
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68 AARON Z. ZIMMERMAN
judges that s9 is true if and only if '5" is written in i?'s judgment box,
where '5" is the LOT sentence activated when R understands the
declarative natural language sentence Y. (Fodor allows that some
times 'S" will be one of several MOPs with the content that s.)
Suppose Lois judges that she is thinking that Superman is heroic.
What, according to the LOT theory of senses, is written in Lois'
judgment box? There are different proposals. According to the
untenable non-hierarchical Fregean view (*) is there written.
According to the hierarchical view it is instead (**)- or something
similar- that appears there.
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A hierarchical view of thought contents is consistent with a rejection of the self-verifying nature of cogito judgments. If we assume the hierarchy exists and have {{John}} as a second-level MOP determining the first-level MOP {John}, it doesn't necessarily mean that considering the second-level sense entails considering the first-level sense. Therefore, a subject could consider the second-level MOP without considering the first-level MOP. This suggests that a subject might be related by judgment to ({S}, {thinking}, ({the only first-level subject-determining MOP denoted by an expression in this paragraph}, {{niceness}})) without being related by thought to ({John}, {niceness}).
An attempt to reconcile the hierarchy with the self-verifying nature of cogito judgments can be made using Jerry Fodor's view. According to Fodor, modes of presentation (MOPs) are types of Language of Thought (LOT) inscriptions. Under this view, when Lois uses 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman,' she refers to the same person, but the MOP deployed with each term is different. Suppose Lois judges that she is thinking that Superman is heroic. According to the LOT theory of senses, the content written in Lois' judgment box could be (*) in the untenable non-hierarchical Fregean view or (**), or something similar, in the hierarchical view.
These points explain that a hierarchical view allows for the possibility of rejecting the self-verifying nature of cogito judgments, and an alternative approach involving the Language of Thought theory attempts to reconcile the hierarchy with self-verifying judgments.
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This article has a citation, in Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325���352 (2008) Copy BIBTEX
Abstract
Recent philosophical discussions of self-knowledge have focused on basic cases: our knowledge of our own thoughts, beliefs, sensations, experiences, preferences, and intentions. Empiricists argue that we acquire this sort of self-knowledge through inner perception; rationalists assign basic self-knowledge an even more secure source in reason and conceptual understanding. I try to split the difference. Although our knowledge of our own beliefs and thoughts is conceptually insured, our knowledge of our experiences is relevantly like our perceptual knowledge of the external world.
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I apologize for any confusion, but the provided article citation is for a different work by Aaron Z. Zimmerman titled "Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism" published in Philosophy Compass in 2008. The summary and discussion provided earlier were based on a different article titled "Self-Verification and the Content of Thought" by Aaron Z. Zimmerman. If you have any specific questions or need assistance related to the mentioned article, please let me know, and I'll do my best to help you.
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Yeah, it says there is one citation, it seems it he cites it in the 2008 article
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I apologize for the misunderstanding. If the article "Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism" by Aaron Z. Zimmerman published in Philosophy Compass in 2008 cites another work, it suggests that Zimmerman refers to the work you mentioned, "Self-Verification and the Content of Thought." The citation indicates a connection between the two articles and implies that Zimmerman's discussion in the 2008 article may build upon or reference the content discussed in the cited work.
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I see it Shoemaker, S. The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 1996.
Shoemaker, S. ���Moore's Paradox and Self-Knowledge���. Philosophical Studies 77 (1995): 211��� 28.
Simon, D. J. and C. F. Chabris. ���Gorillas in Our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events���. Perception 28 (1999): 1059��� 74.
Williamson, T. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000.
Wright, C. ���On Making Up One's Mind: Wittgenstein on Intention���. Logic, Philosophy of Science and Epistemology, Proceedings of the XIth International Wittgenstein Symposium. Eds. P. Weingartner and G. Schurz. Vienna: Holder-Pickler Tempsky, 1987. 391��� 404.
Wright, C. ���Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy and Intention���. Journal of Philosophy 76 (1989): 622��� 34.
Zimmerman, A. ���Basic Self-Knowledge: Answering Peacocke's Criticisms of Constitutivism���. Philosophical Studies 128 (2006): 337��� 79.
Zimmerman, A. ���The Nature of Belief���. Journal of Consciousness Studies. Forthcoming.
Zimmerman, A. ���Putting Extrospection to Rest���. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005): 658��� 61.
Zimmerman, A. ���Self-Verification and the Content of Thought���. Synthese 149 (2006): 59��� 75.
Zimmerman, A. ���Unnatural Access���. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004): 435��� 8.
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Thank you for providing the list of citations. It seems that these are the references cited in Aaron Z. Zimmerman's various works. The citations include works by other authors such as Shoemaker, Simon, Chabris, Williamson, Wright, as well as Zimmerman's own works from different publications. These references likely serve as sources that Zimmerman draws upon to support or contribute to the arguments and discussions in his articles.
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example. Rather, such beliefs are determined by our observations of and interactions with others. Are you rich or poor? Beautiful or ugly? Smart or not? Good or bad at playing video games? And how do you know? These questions can be answered only by looking at those around us. The self has meaning only within the social context, and it is not wrong to say that the social situation defines our self-concept and our self-esteem. We rely on others to provide a ���social reality������to help us determine what to think, feel, and do (Hardin & Higgins, 1996). But what forms do these social influences take? It is to this question that we will now turn.
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The self-concept and self-esteem are shaped by the social context in which we exist. Our beliefs about ourselves, such as our wealth, appearance, intelligence, or skills, are not determined solely by our own perceptions. Instead, they are influenced by our observations and interactions with others. To answer questions about our own attributes, we rely on comparing ourselves to those around us. The social situation we find ourselves in plays a crucial role in defining our sense of self.
Within the social context, others provide us with a "social reality." They contribute to shaping our thoughts, emotions, and behaviors. We look to others for guidance on what to think, how to feel, and what actions to take. This reliance on social influences is fundamental in understanding our self-concept and self-esteem.
Now, let's explore the different forms that these social influences can take.
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Learning Objectives
Describe the concept of the looking-glass self and how it affects our self-concept.
Explore the impact of the labeling bias, self-labeling, and internalized prejudice on people���s self-concepts, particularly in those from marginalized social groups.
Define social comparison, and summarize how people use it to define their self-concepts and self-esteem.
Give examples of the use of upward and downward social comparison and their influences on social cognition and affect.
Explain the concept of social identity and why it is important to human behavior.
Describe how self-evaluation maintenance theory helps to explain how we react when other people���s behaviors threaten our sense of self.
Describe the concept of self-presentation and the various strategies we use to portray ourselves to others.
Outline the concept of reputation management and how it relates to self-presentation.
Discuss the individual-difference variable of self-monitoring and how it relates to the ability and desire to self-present.
To this point, we have seen, among other things, that human beings have complex and well-developed self-concepts and that they generally attempt to view themselves positively. These more cognitive and affective aspects of ourselves do not, of course, occur in a vacuum. They are heavily influenced by the social forces that surround us. We have alluded to some of these forces already; for example, in our review of self-verification theory, we saw how feedback from others can affect our self-concept and esteem. We also looked at ways that our sociocultural backgrounds can affect the content of our self-concept.
In this section, we will consider in more detail these and other social aspects of the self by exploring the many ways that the social situation influences our self-concept and esteem. The self is not created in isolation; we are not born with perceptions of ourselves as shy, interested in jazz, or charitable to others, for
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Learning Objectives:
Understand the concept of the looking-glass self and its impact on our self-concept.
Explore how labeling bias, self-labeling, and internalized prejudice affect the self-concepts of individuals from marginalized social groups.
Define social comparison and its role in shaping self-concepts and self-esteem.
Provide examples of upward and downward social comparison and their effects on social cognition and emotions.
Explain the concept of social identity and its significance in human behavior.
Use self-evaluation maintenance theory to understand how individuals react when their sense of self is threatened by others' behaviors.
Describe self-presentation and the strategies people employ to portray themselves to others.
Discuss reputation management and its connection to self-presentation.
Examine the individual-difference variable of self-monitoring and its relationship to self-presentation.
So far, we have learned that humans possess complex self-concepts and tend to view themselves positively. However, these cognitive and emotional aspects of the self are not formed in isolation. They are profoundly influenced by social forces that surround us. Previous discussions have touched on some of these forces, such as how feedback from others can impact our self-concept and self-esteem. We have also explored how our sociocultural backgrounds shape the content of our self-concept.
In this section, we will delve deeper into these social aspects of the self. We will explore how the social situation influences our self-concept and self-esteem. It is important to recognize that the self does not develop in isolation. We are not born with preconceived notions of being shy, having an interest in jazz, or being charitable to others. Instead, our social environment plays a vital role in shaping our self-perceptions.
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3.3 The Social Self: The Role of the Social Situation
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The social situation plays a significant role in shaping our self-concept and self-esteem. It influences how we perceive ourselves and how we interact with others. Several key factors contribute to the social aspects of the self:
Looking-Glass Self: The looking-glass self theory, proposed by sociologist Charles Cooley, suggests that our self-concept is derived from our understanding of how others perceive us. We imagine how we appear to others, interpret their reactions, and form our self-concept based on these perceptions. For example, if others see us as intelligent and capable, we may develop a positive self-concept.
Labeling Bias: The labeling bias refers to the tendency to incorporate the labels or stereotypes assigned to us by others into our self-concept. Negative labels can have detrimental effects on self-esteem, especially when they are associated with marginalized social groups. For instance, if someone from a marginalized racial or ethnic group is repeatedly labeled as "lazy," it may affect their self-perception and self-esteem.
Self-Labeling: Self-labeling occurs when individuals internalize the labels or categories associated with their social identity. They identify themselves based on societal classifications such as gender, race, or occupation. Self-labeling can influence how individuals perceive themselves and how they behave within social contexts.
Internalized Prejudice: Internalized prejudice refers to the acceptance and internalization of negative stereotypes or prejudices about one's own social group. Individuals from marginalized groups may internalize societal biases, leading to lower self-esteem and a negative self-concept. For example, if someone internalizes stereotypes about their gender or race, it may impact their self-perception and overall well-being.
Social Comparison: Social comparison is the process of evaluating oneself by comparing one's abilities, attributes, or achievements to those of others. We often compare ourselves to others to gain information about our own abilities or to evaluate our self-worth. Social comparison can be upward, where we compare ourselves to those we perceive as better off, or downward, where we compare ourselves to those we perceive as worse off. These comparisons can influence our self-concept and self-esteem.
Social Identity: Social identity refers to the part of our self-concept that is derived from our membership in social groups. It includes aspects such as gender, ethnicity, nationality, or profession. Our social identity contributes to our sense of belonging and can shape our behavior, attitudes, and values.
Understanding the role of the social situation in shaping the self allows us to recognize the impact of social interactions, labels, stereotypes, and comparisons on our self-concept and self-esteem. It emphasizes the importance of creating inclusive and supportive social environments that promote positive self-perceptions and well-being.
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The Looking-Glass Self: Our Sense of Self is Influenced by Others��� Views of Us
The concept of the looking-glass self states that part of how we see ourselves comes from our perception of how others see us (Cooley, 1902). We might feel that we have a great sense of humor, for example, because others have told us, and often laugh (apparently sincerely) at our jokes. Many studies have supported a basic prediction derived from the notion of the looking-glass self, namely that our self-concepts are often quite similar to the views that others have of us (Beer, Watson, & McDade-Montez, 2013). This may be particularly so with people from our own families and culture. Perkins, Wiley, and Deaux (2014), for example, found that, in the United States, how members of ethnic minority groups believed other members of the same culture perceived them significantly correlated with their self-esteem scores. In contrast, their perceived appraisal of European Americans toward them was only weakly related to their self-esteem.
This evidence is merely correlational, though, so we cannot be sure which way the influence is working. Maybe we develop our self-concept quite independently of others, and they then base their views of us on how we see ourselves. The work of Mark Baldwin and colleagues has been particularly important in demonstrating that how we think we are being perceived by others really can affect how we see ourselves.
For example, Baldwin and Holmes (1987) conducted two experiments to test the hypothesis that our self-concepts derive partly from the way we imagine that we would be perceived by significant others. In the first study, 40 women were instructed to visualize the faces of either two acquaintances or two older members of their own family. Later they were asked to rate their perceived enjoyableness of a piece of fiction with sexual content, and they typically responded in keeping with the responses they perceived the people they had visualized would have had. This effect was more pronounced when they sat in front of a mirror (remember the earlier discussion of self-awareness theory). In the second study, 60 men were exposed to a situation involving failure, and their self-evaluations to this setback were then measured. As with the women���s study, the men���s self-evaluations matched those they perceived that the people they were asked to visualize would have made, particularly when they were more self-aware. At least some of the time, then, we end up evaluating ourselves as we imagine others would. Of course, it can work both ways, too. Over time, the people around us may come to accept the self-concept that we present to others (Yeung & Martin, 2003).
Sometimes, the influence of other people���s appraisals of ourselves on our self-concept may be so strong that we end up internalizing them. For example, we are often labeled in particular ways by others, perhaps informally in terms of our ethnic background, or more formally in terms of a physical or psychological diagnosis. The labeling bias occurs when we are labeled, and others��� views and expectations of us are affected by that labeling (Fox & Stinnett, 1996). For example, if a teacher knows that a child has been diagnosed with a particular psychological disorder, that teacher may have different expectations and explanations of the child���s behavior than he or she would if not aware of that label. Where things get really interesting for our present discussion is when those expectations start to become self-fulfilling prophecies, and our self-concept and even our behavior start to align with them. For example, when children are labeled in special education contexts, these labels can then impact their self-esteem (Taylor, Hume, & Welsh, 2010).
If we are repeatedly labeled and evaluated by others, then self-labeling may occur, which happens when we adopt others��� labels explicitly into our self-concept. The effects of this self-labeling on our self-esteem appear to depend very much on the nature of the labels. Labels used in relation to diagnosis of psychological disorders can be detrimental to people whom then internalize them. For example, Moses (2009) found that adolescents who self-labeled according to diagnoses they had received were found to have higher levels of self-stigma in their self-concepts compared with those who described their challenges in non-pathological terms. In these types of situation, those who self-label may come to experience internalized prejudice, which occurs when individuals turn prejudice directed toward them by others onto themselves. Internalized prejudice has been found to predict more negative self-concept and poorer psychological adjustment in members of various groups, including sexual minorities (Carter, 2012) and racial minorities (Szymanski & Obiri, 2011).
In other cases, labels used by wider society to describe people negatively can be positively reclaimed by those being labeled. Galinsky and colleagues (2013) explored this use of self-labeling by members of oppressed groups to reclaim derogatory terms, including ���queer��� and ���bitch,��� used by dominant groups. After self-labeling, minority group members evaluated these terms less negatively, reported feeling more powerful, and were also perceived by observers as more powerful. Overall, these results indicate that individuals who incorporate a formerly negative label into their self-concept in order to reclaim it can sometimes undermine the stigma attached to the label.
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The looking-glass self theory suggests that our self-concept is influenced by how we perceive others' views of us. Research has shown that our self-concepts often align with the views others have of us, especially those from our own families and culture. For example, members of ethnic minority groups' self-esteem was significantly correlated with how they believed others from the same culture perceived them.
Studies by Mark Baldwin and colleagues demonstrate that our self-concept can be affected by how we think we are being perceived by others. Visualizing how significant others would perceive us can influence our self-evaluations and ratings of enjoyment or responses to certain situations. This effect is more pronounced when we are more self-aware, such as when sitting in front of a mirror.
The labeling bias occurs when we are labeled by others, and their views and expectations of us are influenced by those labels. This labeling can impact our self-concept and behavior, leading to self-fulfilling prophecies. When we internalize these labels into our self-concept, it is called self-labeling. The effects of self-labeling on self-esteem depend on the nature of the labels. Labels associated with psychological disorders can be detrimental, leading to self-stigma and negative self-concept. Internalized prejudice occurs when individuals turn prejudice directed at them onto themselves, resulting in a negative self-concept and poorer psychological adjustment.
However, in some cases, individuals reclaim negative labels and incorporate them into their self-concept as a form of empowerment. This self-labeling can help undermine the stigma attached to the label and promote a more positive perception of oneself.
Overall, the social situation and others' appraisals of us play a crucial role in shaping our self-concept and self-esteem. Understanding these influences helps us recognize the impact of labels, stereotypes, and internalized prejudice on our self-perception and provides insight into the potential for empowerment and positive self-identity.
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Social Comparison Theory: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by Comparisons with Others
Self-concept and self-esteem are also heavily influenced by the process of social comparison (Buunk & Gibbons, 2007; Van Lange, 2008). Social comparison occurs when we learn about our abilities and skills, about the appropriateness and validity of our opinions, and about our relative social status by comparing our own attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors with those of others. These comparisons can be with people who we know and interact with, with those whom we read about or see on TV, or with anyone else we view as important. However, the most meaningful comparisons we make tend to be with those we see as similar to ourselves (Festinger, 1954).
Social comparison occurs primarily on dimensions on which there are no correct answers or objective benchmarks and thus on which we can rely only on the beliefs of others for information. Answers to questions such as ���What should I wear to the interview?��� or ���What kind of music should I have at my wedding?��� are frequently determined at least in part by using the behavior of others as a basis of comparison. We also use social comparison to help us determine our skills or abilities���how good we are at performing a task or doing a job, for example. When students ask their teacher for the class average on an exam, they are also seeking to use social comparison to evaluate their performance.
Research Focus
Affiliation and Social Comparison
The extent to which individuals use social comparison to determine their evaluations of events was demonstrated in a set of classic research studies conducted by Stanley Schachter (1959). Schachter���s experiments tested the hypothesis that people who were feeling anxious would prefer to affiliate with others rather than be alone because having others around would reduce their anxiety. Female college students at the University of Minnesota volunteered to participate in one of his experiments for extra credit in their introductory psychology class. They arrived at the experimental room to find a scientist dressed in a white lab coat, standing in front of a large array of electrical machinery. The scientist introduced himself as Dr. Zilstein of the Department of Neurology and Psychiatry, and he told the women that they would be serving as participants in an experiment concerning the effects of electrical shock. Dr. Zilstein stressed how important it was to learn about the effects of shocks, since electroshock therapy was being used more and more commonly and because the number of accidents due to electricity was also increasing!
At this point, the experimental manipulation occurred. One half of the participants (those in the high-anxiety condition) were told that the shocks would be ���painful��� and ���intense,��� although they were assured that they could do no permanent damage. The other half of the participants (those in the low-anxiety condition) were also told that they would be receiving shocks but that they would in no way be painful���rather, the shocks were said to be mild and to resemble a ���tickle��� or a ���tingle.��� Of course, the respondents were randomly assigned to conditions to assure that the women in the two conditions were, on average, equivalent except for the experimental manipulation.
Each of the women was then told that before the experiment could continue the experimenter would have to prepare the equipment and that they would have to wait until he was finished. He asked them if they would prefer to wait alone or with others. The outcome of Schachter���s research was clear: while only 33% of the women who were expecting mild shocks preferred to wait with others, 63% of the women expecting to get painful shocks wanted to wait with others. This was a statistically significant difference, and Schachter concluded that the women chose to affiliate with each other in order to reduce their anxiety about the upcoming shocks.
In further studies, Schachter found that the research participants who were under stress did not want to wait with just any other people. They preferred to wait with other people who were expecting to undergo the same severe shocks that they were rather than with people who were supposedly just waiting to see their professor. Schachter concluded that this was not just because being around other people might reduce our anxiety but because we also use others who are in the same situation as we are to help us determine how to feel about things. As Schachter (1959) put it, ���Misery doesn���t just love any kind of company, it loves only miserable company��� (p. 24). In this case, the participants were expecting to determine from the other participants how afraid they should be of the upcoming shocks.
In short, and as predicted by the idea of social comparison, the women in Schachter���s studies relied on each other to help them understand what was happening to them and to find out how they should feel and respond to their social situations. Again, the power of the social situation���in this case, in determining our beliefs and attitudes���is apparent.
Although Schachter���s studies were conducted in relatively artificial lab settings, similar effects have been found in field studies in more naturally occurring settings. For instance, Kulik, Mahler, and Moore (1996) found that hospital patients who were awaiting surgery preferred to talk to other individuals who were expecting to have similar procedures rather than to patients who were having different procedures, so that they could share information about what they might expect to experience. Furthermore, Kulik and his colleagues found that sharing information was helpful: people who were able to share more information had shorter hospital stays.
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The concept of social comparison theory suggests that our self-concept and self-esteem are influenced by comparing ourselves to others. We engage in social comparison to learn about our abilities, skills, opinions, and social status. The comparisons we make are often with people we perceive as similar to ourselves.
Social comparison occurs primarily on dimensions where there are no objective benchmarks or correct answers, and we rely on the beliefs of others for information. For example, we may use social comparison to decide what to wear to an interview or what kind of music to have at a wedding. We also use social comparison to evaluate our skills and abilities, such as comparing our performance on an exam to the class average.
Research studies, such as those conducted by Stanley Schachter, have demonstrated the impact of social comparison on our evaluations of events and our desire for affiliation. In one study, female college students expecting painful shocks were more likely to prefer waiting with others compared to those expecting mild shocks. This preference for affiliation was driven by a desire to reduce anxiety and seek support from others in similar situations.
These findings highlight that we not only seek social interaction to alleviate anxiety but also use others in similar situations to help us understand and navigate our own emotions and responses. Social comparison provides us with a reference point to determine how we should feel and respond to social situations.
Similar effects have been observed in field studies, such as hospital patients preferring to talk to individuals who are undergoing similar procedures to share information and better understand their experiences. Sharing information in these situations has been found to be beneficial, leading to shorter hospital stays.
Overall, social comparison plays a significant role in shaping our self-concept and self-esteem by providing us with information about our abilities, opinions, and social standing. It influences our beliefs and attitudes, demonstrating the impact of the social situation on our self-perception.
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Self-evaluation maintenance theory (Tesser, 1988) asserts that our self-esteem can be threatened when someone else outperforms us, particularly if that person is close to us and the performance domain is central to our self-concept. This theory leads to the interesting implication that these threats will often occur in the context of our family relationships, and they have been shown to be an integral part of both family functioning in general (Tesser, 1980) and marital relationships in particular (Beach et al., 1996).
When threats occur, the theory states that we will typically try to rebuild our self-esteem using one of three main strategies. The first is distancing, where we redefine ourselves as less close to the person in question. For example, if a close friend keeps beating you at tennis, you may, over time, seek out another playing partner to protect your bruised ego. Interestingly, people who are more narcissistic are more likely to use this tactic than people who are lower in these characteristics (Nicholls & Stukas, 2011). The second option is to redefine how important the trait or skill really is to your self-concept. For instance, you may decide that tennis ability just isn���t that important a part of who you are, and choose to take up another hobby instead. The third strategy is try to improve on the ability in question. In the current example, this would mean practicing more often or hiring a coach to improve your tennis game. Notice the clear parallels between these strategies that occur in response to threats to our self-esteem posed by the behavior of others, and those that are triggered by feelings of self-discrepancy, discussed earlier in this chapter. In both cases, we seek to rebuild our self-esteem by redefining the aspect of ourself that has been diminished.
Self-Presentation: Our Sense of Self Is Influenced by the Audiences We Have
It is interesting to note that each of the social influences on our sense of self that we have discussed can be harnessed as a way of protecting our self-esteem. The final influence we will explore can also be used strategically to elevate not only our own esteem, but the esteem we have in the eyes of others. Positive self-esteem occurs not only when we do well in our own eyes but also when we feel that we are positively perceived by the other people we care about.
seenPositively
Figure 3.12 Being seen positively by others helps us to feel positive about ourselves.
Because it is so important to be seen as competent and productive members of society, people naturally attempt to present themselves to others in a positive light. We attempt to convince others that we are good and worthy people by appearing attractive, strong, intelligent, and likable and by saying positive things to others (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Schlenker, 2003). The tendency to present a positive self-image to others, with the goal of increasing our social status, is known as self-presentation, and it is a basic and natural part of everyday life.
A big question in relation to self-presentation is the extent to which it is an honest versus more strategic, potentially dishonest enterprise. The sociologist Erving Goffman (1959) developed an influential theory of self-presentation and described it as a mainly honest process, where people need to present the parts of themselves required by the social role that they are playing in a given situation. If everyone plays their part according to accepted social scripts and conventions, then the social situation will run smoothly and the participants will avoid embarrassment. Seen in this way, self-presentation is a transparent process, where we are trying to play the part required of us, and we trust that others are doing the same. Other theorists, though, have viewed self-presentation as a more strategic endeavor, which may involve not always portraying ourselves in genuine ways (e.g., Jones & Pittman, 1982). As is often the case with two seemingly opposing perspectives, it is quite likely that both are true in certain situations, depending on the social goals of the actors.
Different self-presentation strategies may be used to create different emotions in other people, and the use of these strategies may be evolutionarily selected because they are successful (Toma, Hancock, & Ellison, 2008). Edward Jones and Thane Pittman (1982) described five self-presentation strategies, each of which is expected to create a resulting emotion in the other person:
The goal of ingratiation is to create liking by using flattery or charm.
The goal of intimidation is to create fear by showing that you can be aggressive.
The goal of exemplification is to create guilt by showing that you are a better person than the other.
The goal of supplication is to create pity by indicating to others that you are helpless and needy.
The goal of self-promotion is to create respect by persuading others that you are competent.
angry
Figure 3.13 Attempts to impress and intimidate others to gain status are not unique to humans.
No matter who is using it, self-presentation can easily be overdone, and when it is, it backfires. People who overuse the ingratiation technique and who are seen as obviously and strategically trying to get others to like them are often disliked because of this. Have you ever had a slick salesperson obviously try to ingratiate him- or herself with you just so you will buy a particular product, and you end up not liking the person and making a hasty retreat from the premises? People who overuse the exemplification or self-promotion strategies by boasting or bragging, particularly if that boasting does not appear to reflect their true characteristics, may end up being perceived as arrogant and even self-deluded (Wosinska, Dabul, Whetstone-Dion, & Cialdini, 1996). Using intimidation can also often backfire; acting more modestly may be more effective. Again, the point is clear: we may want to self-promote with the goal of getting others to like us, but we must also be careful to consider the point of view of the other person. Being aware of these strategies is not only useful for better understanding how to use them responsibly ourselves, it can also help us to understand that other people���s behaviors may often reflect their self-presentational concerns. This can, in turn, facilitate better empathy for others, particularly when they are exhibiting challenging behaviors (Friedlander & Schwartz, 1985). For instance, perhaps someone���s verbally aggressive behavior toward you is more about that person being afraid rather than about his or her desire to do you harm.
��Now that we have explored some of the commonly used self-presentation tactics, let���s look at how they manifest in specific social behaviors. One concrete way to self-promote is to display our positive physical characteristics. A reason that many of us spend money on improving our physical appearance is the desire to look good to others so that they will like us. We can also earn status by collecting expensive possessions such as fancy cars and big houses and by trying to associate with high-status others. Additionally, we may attempt to dominate or intimidate others in social interactions. People who talk more and louder and those who initiate more social interactions are afforded higher status. A businessman who greets others with a strong handshake and a smile, and people who speak out strongly for their opinions in group discussions may be attempting to do so as well. In some cases, people may even resort to aggressive behavior, such as bullying, in attempts to improve their status (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996).
Self-promotion can also be pursued in our online social behaviors. For example, a study in Taiwan conducted by Wang and Stefanone (2013) used survey methodology to investigate the relationship between personality traits, self-presentation and the use of check-ins on Facebook. Interestingly, narcissism was found to predict scores on a measure of exhibitionistic, self-promoting use of Facebook check-ins, which included items like ���I check in so people know that I am with friends,��� and ���I expect friends to like or leave comments on my check-in status on Facebook.���
Other studies have also found associations between narcissistic traits and self-promotional activity on Facebook. Mehdizadeh (2010), for example, found that narcissistic personality scores were positively correlated with the amount of daily logins on Facebook and the duration of each login. Furthermore, narcissistic traits were related to increased use of self-promotional material in the main photo, view photos, status updates, and notes sections of people���s Facebook pages.
Analysis of the content and language used in Facebook postings has also revealed that they are sometimes used by individuals to self-promote. Bazarova, Taft, Choi, and Cosley (2013) explored self-presentation through language styles used in status updates, wall posts, and private messages from 79 participants. The use of positive emotion words was correlated with self-reported self-presentation concern in status updates. This is consistent with the idea that people share positive experiences with Facebook friends partly as a self-enhancement strategy.
Online self-presentation doesn���t seem to be limited to Facebook usage. There is also evidence that self-promotional concerns are often a part of blogging behaviors, too. Mazur and Kozarian (2010), for example, analyzed the content of adolescents��� blog entries and concluded that a careful concern for self-presentation was more central to their blogging behavior than direct interaction with others. This often seems to apply to micro-blogging sites like Twitter. Marwick and Boyd (2011) found that self-presentational strategies were a consistent part of celebrity tweeting, often deployed by celebrities to maintain their popularity and image.
You might not be surprised to hear that men and women use different approaches to self-presentation. Men are more likely to present themselves in an assertive way, by speaking and interrupting others, by visually focusing on the other person when they are speaking, and by leaning their bodies into the conversation. Women, on the other hand, are more likely to be modest; they tend to create status by laughing and smiling, and by reacting more positively to the statements of others (Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, & Keation, 1988).
These gender differences are probably in large part socially determined as a result of the different reinforcements that men and women receive for using particular self-presentational strategies. For example, self-promoting by speaking out and acting assertively can be more effective for men than it is for women, in part because cross-culturally consistent stereotypes tend to depict assertiveness as more desirable in men than in women. These stereotypes can have very important consequences in the real world. For instance, one of the reasons for the ���glass ceiling��� existing in some occupations (where women experience discrimination in reaching top positions in organizations) may be attributable to the more negative reactions that their assertive behaviors, necessary for career advancement, receive than those of their male colleagues (Eagly & Carli, 2007).
There are also some cultural differences in the extent to which people use self-presentation strategies in social contexts. For instance, when considering job interviews, Konig, Haftseinsson, Jansen, & Stadelmann (2011) found that individuals from Iceland and Switzerland used less self-presentational behavior than people from the United States. Differences in self-presentation have also been found in job interviews involving individuals from Ghana, Turkey, Norway, and Germany, with the former two groups showing higher impression management scores than the latter two (Bye et al., 2011).
So far we have been talking about self-presentation as it operates in particular situations in the short-term. However, we also engage in longer-term self-presentational projects, where we seek to build particular reputations with particular audiences. ��Emler & Reicher (1995) describe the unique capacity humans have to know one another by repute and argue that, accordingly, we are often engaged in a process of reputation management, which is a form of long-term self-presentation, where individuals seek to build and sustain specific reputations with important audiences. According to this perspective, our behaviors in current social situations may not only be to serve our self-presentational goals in that moment, but also be based on a consideration of their longer-term repercussions for our reputations. As many politicians, for example, know only too well, a poor decision from their past can come back to haunt them when their reputation is being assessed during a campaign.
The concept of reputation management can be used to help explain a wide variety of social and antisocial behaviors, including corporate branding (Smith, Smith, & Wang, 2010), sociomoral debate (Emler, Tarry, & St. James, 2007), and teenage criminal activity (Lopez-Romero & Romero, 2011). In the last example, it is argued that a lot of teenage antisocial behavior results from a desire to build a reputation for toughness and rebelliousness with like-minded peer audiences (Emler & Reicher, 1995). Similarly, antisocial and self-destructive online actions, like people posting to Facebook their involvement in illegal acts during riots, or individuals engaging in life-threatening activities in Internet crazes like Neknominate, may make more sense if they are considered partly as stemming from a desire to project a particular reputation to specific audiences. Perhaps the perceived social kudos from doing these things outweighs the obvious personal risks in the individuals��� minds at the time.
People often project distinct reputations to different social audiences. For example, adolescents who engage in antisocial activity to build reputations for rebelliousness among their peers will often seek to construct very different reputations when their parents are the audience (Emler & Reicher, 1995). The desire to compartmentalize our reputations and audiences can even spill over into our online behaviors. Wiederhold (2012) found that, with some adolescents��� Facebook friends numbering in the hundreds or thousands, increasing numbers are moving to Twitter in order to reach a more selective audience. One critical trigger for this has been that their parents are now often friends with them on Facebook, creating a need for young people to find a new space where they can build reputations that may not always be parent-friendly (Wiederhold, 2012).
Although the desire to present the self favorably is a natural part of everyday life, both person and situation factors influence the extent to which we do it. For one, we are more likely to self-present in some situations than in others. When we are applying for a job or meeting with others whom we need to impress, we naturally become more attuned to the social aspects of the self, and our self-presentation increases.
There are also individual differences. Some people are naturally better at self-presentation���they enjoy doing it and are good at it���whereas others find self-presentation less desirable or more difficult. An important individual-difference variable known as self-monitoring has been shown in many studies to have a major impact on self-presentation. Self-monitoring refers to the tendency to be both motivated and capable of regulating our behavior to meet the demands of social situations (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). High self-monitors are particularly good at reading the emotions of others and therefore are better at fitting into social situations���they agree with statements such as ���In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons,��� and ���I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people.��� Low self-monitors, on the other hand, generally act on their own attitudes, even when the social situation suggests that they should behave otherwise. Low self-monitors are more likely to agree with statements such as ���At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that others will like,��� and ���I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.��� In short, high self-monitors use self-presentation to try to get other people to like them by behaving in ways that the others find desirable, whereas low self-monitors tend to follow their internal convictions more than the demands of the social situation.
In one experiment that showed the importance of self-monitoring, Cheng and Chartrand (2003) had college students interact individually with another student (actually an experimental confederate) whom they thought they would be working with on an upcoming task. While they were interacting, the confederate subtly touched her own face several times, and the researchers recorded the extent to which the student participant mimicked the confederate by also touching his or her own face.
The situational variable was the status of the confederate. Before the meeting began, and according to random assignment to conditions, the students were told either that they would be the leader and that the other person would be the worker on the upcoming task, or vice versa. The person variable was self-monitoring, and each participant was classified as either high or low on self-monitoring on the basis of his or her responses to the self-monitoring scale.
As you can see in Figure 3.14, ���Self-Monitoring and Behavioral Mimicry,��� Cheng and Chartrand found an interaction effect: the students who had been classified as high self-monitors were more likely to mimic the behavior of the confederate when she was described as being the leader than when she was described as being the worker, indicating that they were ���tuned in��� to the social situation and modified their behavior to appear more positively. Although the low self-monitors did mimic the other person, they did not mimic her more when the other was high, versus low, status. This finding is consistent with the idea that the high self-monitors were particularly aware of the other person���s status and attempted to self-present more positively to the high-status leader. The low self-monitors, on the other hand���because they feel less need to impress overall���did not pay much attention to the other person���s status.
Figure 3.14: Self-Monitoring and Behavioral Mimicry
High self-monitors imitated more when the person they were interacting with was of higher (versus lower) status. Low self-monitors were not sensitive to the status of the other. Data are from Cheng and Chartrand (2003).
This differential sensitivity to social dynamics between high and low self-monitors suggests that their self-esteem will be affected by different factors. For people who are high in self-monitoring, their self-esteem may be positively impacted when they perceive that their behavior matches the social demands of the situation, and negatively affected when they feel that it does not. In contrast, low self-monitors may experience self-esteem boosts when they see themselves behaving consistently with their internal standards, and feel less self-worth when they feel they are not living up to them (Ickes, Holloway, Stinson, & Hoodenpyle, 2006).
Key Takeaways
Our self-concepts are affected by others��� appraisals, as demonstrated by concepts including the looking-glass self and self-labeling.
The self-concept and self-esteem are also often strongly influenced by social comparison. For example, we use social comparison to determine the accuracy and appropriateness of our thoughts, feelings, and behavior.
When we are able to compare ourselves favorably with others through downward social comparison, we feel good about ourselves. Upward social comparison with others who are better off than we are leads to negative emotions.
Social identity refers to the positive emotions that we experience as a member of an important social group.
Normally, our group memberships result in positive feelings, which occur because we perceive our own groups, and thus ourselves, in a positive light.
Which of our many category identities is most accessible for us will vary from day to day as a function of the particular situation we are in.
In the face of others��� behaviors, we may enhance our self-esteem by ���basking in the reflected glory��� of our ingroups or of other people we know.
If other people���s actions threaten our sense of self according to self-evaluation maintenance theory, we may engage in a variety of strategies aimed at redefining our self-concept and rebuilding our self-esteem.
The tendency to present a positive self-image to others, with the goal of increasing our social status, is known as self-presentation, and it is a basic and natural part of everyday life. Different self-presentation strategies may be used to create different emotions in other people.
We often use self-presentation in the longer term, seeking to build and sustain particular reputations with specific social audiences.
The individual-difference variable of self-monitoring relates to the ability and desire to self-present.
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Self-evaluation maintenance theory states that our self-esteem can be threatened when someone close to us outperforms us in a domain that is central to our self-concept. In such situations, we tend to employ strategies to rebuild our self-esteem. These strategies include distancing ourselves from the person, redefining the importance of the domain to our self-concept, or striving to improve our own performance in that domain.