Support Nitro certificate revocation#29
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leopoldjoy
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Addresses Leopold's review: byte-keyed revocation (revoked[keccak256(cert)]) was bypassable. ECDSA signatures are malleable — for a valid (r, s) the twin (r, n-s) also verifies — and DER is re-encodable, so a revoked certificate could be re-presented with different bytes that hash differently but still verify, slipping past the revoked set. Strict DER alone would not fix this (both signatures are valid DER) and enforcing low-S risks bricking on AWS certs. Revocation is now keyed by keccak256(issuerHash, serialHash) — the (issuer, serial) identity AWS CRLs already use, which lives inside the CA-signed TBS and is therefore fixed for every byte-encoding of a given certificate. - Add CertManager.computeCertId(certDER) so operators derive the key (and can replicate it off-chain straight from CRL issuer/serial entries). - Record each cert's identity at cold verification (certIdentity mapping) so the warm path and parent-chain walk check revocation without re-parsing. - Root halt stays keyed by the pinned ROOT_CA_CERT_HASH (the root is never parsed on-chain) and remains owner-only. - Tests: revoke real CA/leaf certs via computeCertId; add test_RevocationIdentityIsInvariantToSignatureBytes showing a signature-byte variant (different keccak256) maps to the same identity key. - Docs: README, design doc, CHANGELOG updated to the identity-keyed model. Generated with Claude Code Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Focused tests from the security review of the hinted P-384 change (tests only). Revocation landed in base#29 and the forward-compatibility implementation + docs in base#32, so this carries only the adversarial soundness tests that part of the review surfaced. test/hinted/HintedNitroAttestation.t.sol (via a small U384TestWrapper): - test_UnreducedInverseHintIsSound — a non-canonical inverse hint (inv + p) passes the on-chain b*inv == 1 check and yields the identical reduced result, so it cannot change the accept decision. - test_ModulusConfusionHintReverts — a hint valid mod n is rejected where mod p is expected. - test_CorruptedSignatureNeverAccepts — no hint stream makes a corrupted signature verify: non-self-consistent hints (empty/garbage/original/padded) revert at the inverse-hint gate, and self-consistent hints collected for the corrupted sig pass the gate but fail the final ECDSA curve check (returns false). - test_MalleableTwinSignatureAccepted — (r, n-s) also verifies (intentional, CURVE_LOW_S_MAX = n-1) and decodes to the identical attestation. - test_AttestationReplayHasNoOnChainProtection — the same (tbs, sig) verifies repeatedly; freshness/replay is the integrator's responsibility. test/CertManager.t.sol: - test_CacheGriefingSameKeyCaRenewalBricksCachedLeaf — skipped spec documenting the verifiedParent first-writer-wins liveness edge. Adds P384HintCollector.collectVerifyHintsAllowInvalid so a self-consistent hint stream can be collected for a signature that fails the final check. Generated with Claude Code Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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…33) Focused tests from the security review of the hinted P-384 change (tests only). Revocation landed in #29 and the forward-compatibility implementation + docs in #32, so this carries only the adversarial soundness tests that part of the review surfaced. test/hinted/HintedNitroAttestation.t.sol (via a small U384TestWrapper): - test_UnreducedInverseHintIsSound — a non-canonical inverse hint (inv + p) passes the on-chain b*inv == 1 check and yields the identical reduced result, so it cannot change the accept decision. - test_ModulusConfusionHintReverts — a hint valid mod n is rejected where mod p is expected. - test_CorruptedSignatureNeverAccepts — no hint stream makes a corrupted signature verify: non-self-consistent hints (empty/garbage/original/padded) revert at the inverse-hint gate, and self-consistent hints collected for the corrupted sig pass the gate but fail the final ECDSA curve check (returns false). - test_MalleableTwinSignatureAccepted — (r, n-s) also verifies (intentional, CURVE_LOW_S_MAX = n-1) and decodes to the identical attestation. - test_AttestationReplayHasNoOnChainProtection — the same (tbs, sig) verifies repeatedly; freshness/replay is the integrator's responsibility. test/CertManager.t.sol: - test_CacheGriefingSameKeyCaRenewalBricksCachedLeaf — skipped spec documenting the verifiedParent first-writer-wins liveness edge. Adds P384HintCollector.collectVerifyHintsAllowInvalid so a self-consistent hint stream can be collected for a signature that fails the final check. Generated with Claude Code Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
CertManager, with a separaterevokerrole for one-off or batch certificate revocations.notAfter.Stack
hinted_p384).leanthebean:hinted_p384...leanthebean:nitro-cert-revocation.Testing
forge fmt --checkforge build --sizesforge testNITRO_RUN_FFI=true forge test --ffi --match-test test_OffchainWitnessnode --check tools/nitro_attestation_input.jsnode --check tools/hinted_attestation_calls.jsnode tools/nitro_attestation_input.js fixturenode tools/hinted_attestation_calls.js fixturegit diff --check