chore: comprehensive publish hardening - #90
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Layered defenses against the v1.2.1 leak class. Each layer is independent — a future maintainer can disable any one of them and the others still hold. Layer 1 — Cargo.toml whitelist (`include` instead of `exclude`): The package now ships only `src/**/*.rs`, `LICENSE`, `README.md`, and the metadata files cargo always auto-includes (`Cargo.toml`, `Cargo.lock`, `Cargo.toml.orig`, `.cargo_vcs_info.json`). Anything else — `.env`, `.omc/`, `.claude/`, IDE state, dev docs, CI configs — cannot leak by accident, because adding new files no longer expands the publish surface unless someone explicitly lists them. Drops `Dockerfile`, `docker-compose.yml`, `.dockerignore`, `.github/`, `AGENTS.md`, `CLAUDE.md`, `TECH_SPEC.md`, `tests/`, `.gitignore` from the published crate (none used by consumers). Layer 2 — `.gitignore` extensions: Adds editor/IDE state (`.vscode/`, `.cursor/`, `.idea/`), swap and backup files (`*.swp`, `*.swo`, `*~`, `*.bak`), build/coverage artifacts (`*.log`, `coverage/`, `*.profraw`, `lcov.info`, `tarpaulin-report.html`), and a categorical credential block (`*.pem`, `*.key`, `id_rsa*`, `id_ed25519*`, `*credentials*`, `*secrets*`). Categorical because new file names matching these shapes are almost always sensitive. Layer 3 — `.dockerignore` parity: Adds `.omc/`, `.env`, `.env.*` so `COPY . .` in the Dockerfile cannot bake them into image layers if anyone later publishes the container. Layer 4 — CI secret scan (gitleaks): New `security` job runs `gitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2` against the full history on every push/PR. Free for public repos. Would have caught the v1.2.1 leak before publish. Layer 5 — CI dependency audit (cargo-audit): Same job runs `cargo audit` for known RUSTSEC advisories. Marked `continue-on-error: true` so a fresh advisory doesn't block unrelated PRs but still surfaces in the run log. Layer 6 — CI publish-package audit: Same job runs `cargo package --list` and greps for sensitive patterns; CI fails before crates.io ever sees a leak. Belt and suspenders for Layer 1 — even if `include` is later loosened, this still catches additions matching the patterns. Verified locally: - `cargo package --list` shows the 35 expected files (no Dockerfile / .github / CLAUDE.md / tests / etc). - Sensitive-pattern grep against the package list returns nothing. - `cargo build && cargo test && cargo clippy -- -D warnings && cargo fmt --check` all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: Yonghye Kwon <developer.0hye@gmail.com>
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Summary
Layered defenses against the v1.2.1 leak class. Each layer is independent — disabling any one still leaves the others holding.
Cargo.tomlwhitelistinclude = ["src/**/*.rs", "/LICENSE", "/README.md"]— published surface is now exactly source code + license + readme + cargo's auto files. Anything else cannot leak.Cargo.toml.gitignoreextensions.vscode/,.cursor/,.idea/), swap/backup files, build/coverage artifacts, and a categorical credential block (*.pem,*.key,id_rsa*,*credentials*,*secrets*).gitignore.dockerignoreparity.omc/,.env,.env.*soCOPY . .can't bake them into a future container image.dockerignoregitleaks/gitleaks-action@v2over full git history — would have caught v1.2.1 before publishci.yml(newsecurityjob)cargo auditfor known RUSTSEC advisories;continue-on-error: trueso advisory churn doesn't block unrelated PRscargo package --listpiped through a sensitive-pattern grep; CI fails before crates.io ever sees a leak. Belt and suspenders for Layer 1Package contents diff
Drops these dev-only files from the published crate (none used by consumers):
Dockerfile,docker-compose.yml,.dockerignore.github/(CI configs, issue templates)AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md,TECH_SPEC.md.gitignoretests/(test code + binary fixtures)After this PR,
cargo package --listreturns 35 files:src/**/*.rs(29 source files) +Cargo.toml/Cargo.lock/Cargo.toml.orig/.cargo_vcs_info.json+LICENSE+README.md.Test plan
cargo package --list --allow-dirty— exactly the 35 expected files; sensitive-pattern grep matches nothingcargo build && cargo test && cargo clippy -- -D warnings && cargo fmt --checkall green🤖 Generated with Claude Code