fix(crypto): authenticate braid vault, signature and RWP2 paths - #2859
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Legacy signature verification accepted fabricated marker bytes and could ignore a backend's false verdict. The custom braid vault returned unauthenticated XOR plaintext, and connected RWP2/Aethercode authentication paths used public demo keys or always-true verification. This change requires actual message/key verification and authenticated vault entries while retaining the existing experimental master derivation.
Both shipped signing/SS1 copies are covered. Unsupported signed/hybrid requests in the legacy SS1 format now reject instead of dropping security fields. Vault rotation validates and stages every entry before updating state; original expiry survives rotation. Old unauthenticated entries require an explicit, separately reviewed recovery procedure; there is no automatic downgrade or deletion.
RWP2 now requires explicitly provisioned keys, authenticates canonical typed fields including tier/key ID/version, separates tongue MAC domains, and enforces each tier's minimum signers. Its process-local replay cache authenticates first, records atomically, and rejects capacity overflow instead of evicting live receipts. Aethercode uses a real HMAC and verifies a message plus tag; ordinary non-signing interpretation still works without keys. Old delimiter-based tags and public demo keys are deliberately rejected; peers must be updated together.
Validation: 102 focused security/vault tests, 416 compatibility/tri-bundle/core-runner tests and 39 RWP2/caller/full-system checks passed (one pre-existing large-allocation test is skipped). Before repair, initial regressions exposed the signing/vault defects and a separate baseline reproduced eight RWP2/Aethercode authentication failures. Ruff, Black and diff checks pass. CI includes the new regressions and real ML-DSA-65 tests through both signature adapters, including wrong key/message, truncation and the old fake prefix. The native CI dependency was corrected after an initial missing-cryptography setup failure; the final native run must pass before merging.
The review document separates custom composition, fingerprints, reversible indexing and geometry from authentication. Remaining limits include custom-derivation cryptanalysis, operator key custody, shared durable replay state, and the distinction between a signed trace and proof of correct execution. No new cryptographic hardness, quantum security, FIPS validation or NIST certification is claimed. Reverting this repair reintroduces authentication defects and is not a safe downgrade path.