chore: pin all non-docker/non-GH action versions

.github/workflows/docker-pull.yml

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ jobs:
       # For PRs, this action compares between the commit and trunk
       - name: Get specific changed files
         id: changed-files-specific
-        uses: tj-actions/changed-files@v44
+        uses: tj-actions/changed-files@2f7c5bfce28377bc069a65ba478de0a74aa0ca32
         with:
           files: |
             Dockerfile

.github/workflows/pages.yml

@@ -20,14 +20,14 @@ jobs:
           submodules: true
           fetch-depth: 0
       - name: Run Doxygen
-        uses: mattnotmitt/doxygen-action@edge
+        uses: mattnotmitt/doxygen-action@b84fe17600245bb5db3d6c247cc274ea98c15a3b
         with:
           working-directory: .
           doxyfile-path: ./Doxyfile
           enable-latex: false
           additional-packages: graphviz
       - name: Deploy GitHub Pages
-        uses: peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@v4
+        uses: peaceiris/actions-gh-pages@4f9cc6602d3f66b9c108549d475ec49e8ef4d45e
         with:
           deploy_key: ${{ secrets.TX_PAGES_DEPLOY_KEY }}
           external_repository: mit-dci/opencbdc-tx-pages

NEWS.md

@@ -1,3 +1,32 @@
+# 2025-03-19: Pinning all 3rd-party GH action versions to specific commits
+
+<details>
+<summary>Mitigating the Risk of Action Repository Compromise</summary>
+
+## Motivation
+
+As discovered and reported by [StepSecurity](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/harden-runner-detection-tj-actions-changed-files-action-is-compromised), between 2025-03-14 and 2025-03-15, [a widely-used GitHub action](https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files) was compromised.
+We, **and by extension all our forks**, use this action in our CI/CD workflow to test docker image builds when the ``Dockerfile`` itself changes.
+
+This exploit relied upon the ability to update a repository's tags (which are typically the default mechanism to pin an action to a specific version).
+
+**N.B.:** Our affected repositories had no CI runs during the compromised period, and so none of our PATs are expected to have been compromised.
+Out of an abundance of caution, we have rotated all relevant secrets regardless;
+you may wish to do the same.
+
+## Correction
+
+Following [GitHub's recommendations](https://docs.github.com/en/actions/security-for-github-actions/security-guides/security-hardening-for-github-actions#using-third-party-actions), pinning all third-party actions to specific commits dramatically reduces the practicality of this attack.
+There are resources to take this mitigation [further](https://michaelheap.com/pin-your-github-actions/), but to minimize maintenance burden and workflow churn, we have taken a more minimal mitigation step.
+**Note,** this posture is partly due to the fact that this work is research-grade and **is not production-ready**!
+
+## Action You Should Take
+
+You should not need to take any actions to handle this change to our workflows, but you should carefully review StepSecurity's [documented recovery steps](https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/harden-runner-detection-tj-actions-changed-files-action-is-compromised#recovery-steps) and determine if you should take further action for your own repositories!
+
+</details>
+
+
 # 2022-04-05: Force-push against `trunk`
 
 <details>