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Security: polarsquad/kaipr

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

kaipr is a working reference for an AI platform built on agentgateway, reconciled onto a GitOps-managed kind cluster through the Kubernetes API. It is not a product with a release cadence, but its manifests, scripts, CLI, container image, and CI workflows can be pointed at real clusters, so security reports are taken seriously.

Reporting a vulnerability

Report privately through GitHub: Report a vulnerability. This opens a draft security advisory visible only to the repository maintainers.

Do not open a public issue, pull request, or discussion for anything that could be exploited before a fix is available. That includes a committed credential, a literal secret introduced into the tree, or a CI workflow that can be made to run untrusted code with repository permissions.

Include:

  • The affected path or component (manifest, script, bootstrap-rs/, the toolbox image, a workflow, renovate.json5).
  • The commit on main you tested against.
  • Steps to reproduce.
  • Impact as you understand it: what an attacker gains and which part of the reference (the kind cluster, the AI platform, CI) is affected.

You will get an acknowledgement within 7 days. Maintainers volunteer their time; there is no paid response team and no bug bounty. Please allow up to 90 days before public disclosure, or coordinate an earlier date once a fix is merged.

Supported versions

Only main is supported. There are no release branches. The toolbox image ghcr.io/polarsquad/kaipr-toolbox is published from v* tags when they exist; the newest tag is the only supported image version, and fixes land on main first.

Scope

In scope:

  • Kubernetes manifests under workload/, including the AI-platform manifests (workload/local-host/ai-platform/) and the Gateway API / Inference Extension / agentgateway resources they declare.
  • The bootstrap and teardown lifecycle: bootstrap-rs/, the shell scripts, bootstrap.toml, and scripts/toolbox-run.sh.
  • The toolbox container image and its signing and SBOM attestation.
  • GitHub Actions workflows under .github/workflows/, including token permissions and fork handling.
  • The Renovate configuration, where a malicious or mistaken rule could pull an unintended dependency.
  • Secret handling: the no-secrets design (no cloud credentials, no API keys), .env handling, and anything that could leak a credential into Git, logs, or CI artifacts.

Out of scope:

  • Vulnerabilities in upstream projects the repository consumes (Flux, agentgateway, the llm-d Router, kind). Report those upstream; a report here is welcome only if kaipr configures the component in a way that makes the issue worse or bypasses a mitigation.
  • Deployments made from forks or adapted copies of this repository. The README states the intended use: fork it and adapt it. Once adapted, the security posture is the operator's.

What the repository already does

Knowing the existing controls helps frame whether a finding is a bypass or a gap.

  • Secrets are in-tree only as SOPS-encrypted *.sops.yaml manifests under workload/ (only data/stringData is encrypted, so Git carries no plaintext credential). The age private key is local and gitignored (age.agekey); bootstrap seeds it as the sops-age secret in flux-system, the cluster's only decryption path. There are no cloud credentials. .env is gitignored and only carries optional container- engine and port knobs. If an operator points the backend at an external model, the key is encrypted into a *.sops.yaml manifest (see docs/secrets.md), never committed as a literal.

  • The AI platform's OpenAI-compatible path needs no API key; the CPU simulator produces model-shaped completions without a backend.

  • The konflate PR review workflow uses only the workflow GITHUB_TOKEN (contents: read, plus the scopes it needs to post the summary comment) and is skipped for pull requests from forks so untrusted sources are not rendered with repository permissions. No PATs or stored secrets are used.

  • The toolbox image is signed with cosign keyless (GitHub OIDC, workflow identity) and carries an SPDX SBOM attestation. Verify with:

    cosign verify ghcr.io/polarsquad/kaipr-toolbox:X.Y.Z \
      --certificate-identity-regexp \
        '^https://github.com/polarsquad/kaipr/.github/workflows/toolbox-release.yml@refs/tags/vX.Y.Z$' \
      --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
  • Dependency updates are proposed by the hosted Renovate GitHub App and reviewed as ordinary pull requests, rendered as Flux diffs before merge.

If you find a committed secret

Treat it as compromised even if it was removed in a later commit; Git history and forks retain it.

  1. Report it privately as described above.
  2. Maintainers rotate the credential using the provider's own procedure, then merge the removal.
  3. The exposure is disclosed in the advisory once rotation is confirmed.

Attribution

Reporters are credited in the published advisory unless they ask not to be.

There aren't any published security advisories