If you discover a security vulnerability, please report it privately:

1. Do not open a public issue
2. Email: sauloverissimo@gmail.com
3. Include: description, steps to reproduce, potential impact

You will receive a response within 48 hours. Confirmed vulnerabilities will be patched and disclosed responsibly.

Gingoduino is a music theory engine. It carries no network, file, or OS access of its own; the library transforms musical structures into serialized formats (MIDI 1.0 bytes and MIDI 2.0 UMP Flex Data) using caller-provided storage. Security concerns are limited to:

• Buffer overflows in output adapters (GingoMIDI1::fromEvent, GingoMIDI1::fromSequence, GingoMIDI2::chordName, GingoMIDI2::keySignature, GingoMIDI2::perNoteController) when the caller-provided buffer is smaller than required
• Out-of-bounds reads in GingoChord::identify, GingoField::deduce, and similar interpretive functions when the input note or branch count exceeds expected ranges
• Integer overflows in value scaling between 7, 14, 16, and 32-bit MIDI fields
• Malformed input strings (chord names, scale type names, branch identifiers) causing unexpected lookups
• Out-of-bounds reads in PROGMEM lookup tables on AVR targets when index parameters fall outside table bounds

• The native test suite (504 tests) runs under AddressSanitizer and UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer in CI on every push to main
• All caller-provided buffers are length-checked before write
• All array index parameters are validated before PROGMEM read
• No dynamic allocation eliminates use-after-free and double-free classes
• FixedStr<N> and FixedArray<T, N> carry their capacity at the type level, so out-of-bounds writes are bounded at compile time