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Security: simplesconsultoria/zodb-backup

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

zodb-backup is in alpha and has not had a stable release. Only the most recent release receives fixes; there are no maintenance branches for older versions.

Version Supported
Latest release
Anything older

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for a security problem.

Report it privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting, or by email to contato@simplesconsultoria.com.br.

Please include:

  • what an attacker can do, and what access they need to do it;
  • the version or image tag affected;
  • the configuration involved — particularly PRE_COMMAND / POST_COMMAND, RSYNC_OPTIONS, and the uid the container runs as;
  • a reproduction, if you have one.

We will acknowledge your report within five working days and keep you updated as we work on it. If the report is accepted we will agree a disclosure date with you, credit you in the advisory unless you prefer otherwise, and publish a GitHub Security Advisory alongside the fix.

Scope

This tool reads a ZODB database and writes backups of it. The things worth reporting are, in rough order of severity:

  • Silent data loss or corruption — a backup that appears to succeed but cannot be restored, a restore that produces a database differing from the one backed up, or retention deleting a backup that is still needed. This is the most serious class of bug in a backup tool, whether or not an attacker is involved, and we treat it as a security issue.
  • Command injection through configuration values, especially the hook variables and RSYNC_OPTIONS, which are deliberately passed to a shell.
  • Path traversal or privilege issues in the backup and restore paths, or anything that lets the tool write outside its configured locations.
  • Secret disclosure — credentials or database contents leaking into logs, error messages, or backup filenames.

Known and documented limitations are not vulnerabilities. These are described in the README and are working as designed:

  • backups are written unencrypted;
  • hook commands run through a shell by design, so anyone who can set PRE_COMMAND or POST_COMMAND can already run arbitrary commands as the container user — treat those variables as equivalent to shell access;
  • rsync's size+mtime quick check can miss a same-length rewrite within one second (not reachable through ZODB, whose blobs are immutable).

Upstream

zodb-backup drives ZODB's repozo in process. A vulnerability in ZODB itself should be reported to the ZODB project. If you are unsure which side a problem belongs to, report it to us and we will route it.

There aren't any published security advisories