fix(workspaces): address review comments across stacked PRs

[raivieiraadriano92]

Single follow-up PR addressing review comments across the stacked workspaces feature PRs. One commit per fix; each original thread has a `Fixed in ` reply pointing here.

Stacked PRs covered (base → tip):

• feat(THU-549): Workspaces Foundation #932
• feat(THU-550): Workspaces data layer #944
• feat(THU-578): scope all FE DAL methods to active workspaceId #951
• feat(THU-553): mode picker UI — layout, selection state, and connectivity #958
• feat(THU-551): workspace selector in sidebar + URL-based active workspace #961
• feat(THU-552): create workspace modal — name + invite by email #965
• feat(THU-554): Settings → Workspace → General (rename, slug, icon, duplicate) #971
• feat(THU-555): Settings → Workspace → Members (add / remove / role / pending) #974
• feat(THU-556): Settings → Workspace → Permissions page + resource-CRUD enforcement #978

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Note

High Risk
Changes authorization on membership and pending-invite uploads, expands who receives pending-invite sync data, and reorders sign-out/token/credential wiping—mistakes could allow privilege escalation, leave sessions or keys on disk, or break multi-tab logout.

Overview
This PR tightens workspace membership authorization end-to-end: PowerSync upload handlers no longer treat “workspace admin” as the only gate. Writes use workspace_permissions keys (invite_users, change_roles, remove_users) via shared callerSatisfiesPermission, with extra guards so invite_users alone cannot mint or promote admins, PUT upserts cannot demote admins or bypass change_roles, and last-admin protection applies on membership PUT as well as PATCH/DELETE. Pending-invite handling is hardened: email format validation, invited_by_user_id forced to the caller, promote-on-insert uses insert-if-missing (no role downgrade) and delete pending by workspace+email after unique-key conflicts.

Sync rules move workspace_pending_memberships from the admin-only bucket into workspace_data so members granted invite/role/remove permissions can see pending rows; upload handlers remain the write authority.

On the client, the Members route is readable by any shared-workspace member; Add / role / remove controls align with the granular keys (pending lifecycle gated on invite_users). useActiveWorkspaceId can resolve from the URL before the workspace row exists; cross-workspace navigation resets chat detail paths to /chats/new. Sign-out wipe clears activeTrustDomain early for multi-tab safety, passes captured serverId into credential and encryption key cleanup, and defers token clearing until after authenticated signOut (withCapturedAuthToken). Smaller fixes include workspace PUT preserving omitted slug/icon, SERVER_ID validation messages, app error boundary, mode-picker stale validation, and duplicate-workspace slug suffixes.

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