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Transport Layer Security D. Venhoek
Internet-Draft Tweede Golf B.V.
Intended status: Standards Track W. Bokslag
Expires: 16 March 2025 Midnight Blue
M. Schoolderman
Tweede Golf B.V.
E. Nygren
S. Erb
Akamai Technologies
A. Biryukov
D. Khovratovich
University of Luxembourg
A. Juels
Cornell Tech and Cornell University
12 September 2024
TLS Client Puzzles Extension
draft-venhoek-tls-client-puzzles-00
Abstract
Client puzzles allow a TLS server to defend itself against asymmetric
DDoS attacks. In particular, it allows a server to request clients
perform a selected amount of computation prior to the server
performing expensive cryptographic operations. This allows servers
to employ a layered defense that represents an improvement over pure
rate-limiting strategies.
Client puzzles are implemented as an extension to TLS 1.3 [RFC8446]
wherein a server can issue a HelloRetryRequest containing the puzzle
as an extension. The client must then resend its ClientHello with
the puzzle results in the extension.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 March 2025.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Overview and rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Handshake Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. The ClientPuzzleExtension Message . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Usage by Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. GREASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Client Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Server Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Proposed Client Puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Echo Client Puzzle Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.2. SHA-256 CPU Puzzle Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.3. SHA-512 CPU Puzzle Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6.4. Equihash: Memory-hard Generalized Birthday Problem Puzzle
Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Overview and rationale
Adversaries can exploit the design of the TLS protocol to craft
powerful asymmetric DDOS attacks. Once an attacker has opened a TCP
connection, the attacker can transmit effectively static content that
causes the server to perform expensive cryptographic operations.
Rate limiting offers one possible defense against this type of
attack; however, pure rate limiting systems represent an incomplete
solution:
1. Rate limiting systems work best when a small number of bots are
attacking a single server. Rate limiting is much more difficult
when a large number of bots are directing small amounts of
traffic to each member of a large distributed pool of servers.
2. Rate limiting systems encounter problems where a mixture of
"good" and "bad" clients are hidden behind a single NAT or Proxy
IP address and thus are all stuck being treated on equal footing.
3. Rate limiting schemes often penalize well-behaved good clients
(which try to complete handshakes and may limit their number of
retries) much more heavily than they penalize attacking bad
clients (which may try to disguise themselves as good clients,
but which otherwise are not constrained to behave in any
particular way).
Client puzzles are complementary to rate-limiting and give servers
another option than just rejecting some fraction of requests. A
server can provide a puzzle (of varying and server-selected
complexity) to a client as part of a HelloRetryRequest extension.
The client must choose to either abandon the connection or solve the
puzzle and resend its ClientHello with a solution to the puzzle.
Puzzles are designed to have asymmetric complexity such that it is
much cheaper for the server to generate and validate puzzles than it
is for clients to solve them.
Client puzzle systems may be inherently “unfair” to clients that run
with limited resources (such as mobile devices with batteries and
slow CPUs). However, client puzzle schemes will typically only be
evoked when a server is under attack and would otherwise be rejecting
some fraction of requests. The overwhelming majority of transactions
will never involve a client puzzle. Indeed, if client puzzles are
successful in forcing adversaries to use a new attack vector, the
presence of client puzzles will be completely transparent to end
users.
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It is likely that not all clients will choose to support this
extension. During attack scenarios, servers will still have the
option to apply traditional rate limiting schemes (perhaps with
different parameters) to clients not supporting this extension or
using a version of TLS prior to 1.3.
2. Notational Conventions
The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL NOT”,
“SHOULD”, “SHOULD NOT”, “RECOMMENDED”, “MAY”, and “OPTIONAL” in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Messages are formatted with the notation as described within
[RFC8446].
3. Handshake Changes
Client puzzles are implemented as a new ClientPuzzleExtension to TLS
1.3 [RFC8446]. A client supporting the ClientPuzzleExtension MUST
indicate support by sending a ClientPuzzleExtension along with their
ClientHello containing a list of puzzle types supported, but with no
puzzle response. When a server wishes to force the client to solve a
puzzle, it MAY send a HelloRetryRequest with a ClientPuzzleExtension
containing a puzzle of a supported puzzle type and with associated
parameters. To continue with the handshake, a client MUST resend
their ClientHello with a ClientPuzzleExtension containing a response
to the puzzle. The ClientHello must otherwise be identical to the
initial ClientHello, other than for attributes that are defined by
specification to not be identical.
If a puzzle would consume too many resources, a client MAY choose to
abort the handshake with the new fatal alert “puzzle_too_hard” and
terminate the connection.
A typical handshake when a puzzle is issued will look like:
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Client Server
ClientHello
+ ClientPuzzleExtension
+ ClientKeyShare -------->
<-------- HelloRetryRequest
+ ClientPuzzleExtension
ClientHello
+ ClientPuzzleExtension
+ ClientKeyShare -------->
ServerHello
ServerKeyShare
{EncryptedExtensions*}
{ServerConfiguration*}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateRequest*}
{CertificateVerify*}
<-------- {Finished}
{Certificate*}
{CertificateVerify*}
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
Figure 1. Message flow for a handshake with a client puzzle
* Indicates optional or situation-dependent messages that are not
always sent.
{} Indicates messages protected using keys derived from the ephemeral
secret.
[] Indicates messages protected using keys derived from the master
secret.
Note in particular that the major cryptographic operations (starting
to use the ephemeral secret and generating the CertificateVerify) are
performed _after_ the server has received and validated the
ClientPuzzleExtension response from the client.
3.1. The ClientPuzzleExtension Message
The ClientPuzzleExtension message contains the communication
necessary for the client puzzle mechanims to work. It is used for
three purposes:
* In a ClientHello to indicate which puzzles are supported.
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* In a HelloRetryRequest to provide the client with a specific
puzzle to solve.
* In a retried ClientHello to provide the server with the solution
to the puzzle.
struct {
ClientPuzzleType type<2..254>;
opaque client_puzzle_challenge_response<0..2^16-1>;
} ClientPuzzleExtension;
enum {
echo (0),
sha256_cpu (1),
sha512_cpu (2),
birthday_puzzle (3),
(0xFFFF)
} ClientPuzzleType;
The interpretation of the fields of the ClientPuzzleExtension depends
on the purpose for which the extension field is sent. In a
ClientHello, they should follow:
type: When the extension is used to convey supported puzzles, this
MUST contain a list of all puzzle types supported by the
implementation. When used to transport the solution to a puzzle,
this field MUST contain a single puzzle type, and MUST contain the
type of the puzzle for which a solution is in the
"client_puzzle_challenge_response" field.
client_puzzle_challenge_response When the extension is used to
convey supported puzzles, this MUST be empty. When used to
transport a puzzle solution, it MUST contain a solution to the
puzzle type indicated in the "type" field.
If the server provides a HelloRetryRequest, they should follow:
type: The type field MUST contain the type of the puzzle provided to
the client. In HelloRetryRequest messages, it MUST always contain
a single puzzle type.
client_puzzle_challenge_response This field MUST contain a puzzle of
the type indicated by the "type" field.
Note that a server MAY choose not to provide a puzzle in a
HelloRetryRequest, even if it supports the client puzzle extension.
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Clients supporting the ClientPuzzleExtension MUST send a
ClientPuzzleExtension listing all supported puzzles in their initial
ClientHello message. Unless provided with a puzzle, they MUST also
repeat this extension in any retried ClientHello.
A supporting server MAY send a client indicating support for the
ClientPuzzleExtension a puzzle of a type the client indicated support
for. A server MUST ignore puzzle types send by the client for which
it has no support. A server MUST NOT send a puzzle for a type not
supported by the client according to its initial ClientHello. A
server MAY abort a connection with clients not supporting the
ClientPuzzleExtension or if there is no overlap between the puzzle
types acceptable to the server and those supported by the client.
The server MAY send a "handshake_failure" alert in such cases.
A client receiving a puzzle from the server MAY abort the connection
if the puzzle difficulty is perceived to be too high. A client MAY
send a "handshake_failure" alert in such cases. If a client sends a
retried ClientHello after receiving a client puzzle from the server,
it MUST provide a ClientPuzzleExtension containing a solution to that
puzzle. A server receiving a retried ClientHello without a valid
solution after providing a puzzle MUST abort the connection,
optionally sending a "missing_extension" alert.
A client that receives a puzzle of a type it does not support MUST
abort the connection. It MAY send an "illegal_parameter" alert in
such cases. A server that receives a puzzle solution of a type it
never gave a challenge for MUST abort the connection. It MAY send an
"illegal_parameter" alert in such cases.
4. Usage by Servers
Servers MAY send puzzles to clients when under duress, and the
percentage of clients receiving puzzles and the complexity of the
puzzles both MAY be selected as a function of the degree of duress.
Servers MAY use additional factors, such as client IP reputation
information, to determine when to send a puzzle as well as the
complexity.
5. GREASE
To exercise both the solvers in clients, as well as the mechanisms
for adding new puzzle types, we add a greasing mechanism similar to
that proposed in [RFC8701].
The following puzzle types are reserved as GREASE values for the
puzzle type field:
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0x0A0A
0x1A1A
0x2A2A
0x3A3A
0x4A4A
0x5A5A
0x6A6A
0x7A7A
0x8A8A
0x9A9A
0xAAAA
0xBABA
0xCACA
0xDADA
0xEAEA
0xFAFA
5.1. Client Behavior
When indicating support for client puzzles, a client MAY behave as
follows:
* A client MAY select one or more of the GREASE puzzle types and
advertise them in the ClientPuzzleExtension as supported.
A client MUST abort the connection if it receives a GREASE type
challenge. It MAY send an "illegal_parameter" alert in such cases.
Note that this can be implemented without special processing, as this
matches the normal behavior for unsupported puzzle types.
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5.2. Server Behavior
When responding to a ClientHello, a server MAY behave as follows:
* A server MAY choose to request the client to solve a puzzle even
when not under duress. A server SHOULD choose low difficulty for
such puzzles so as to not unnecessarily burden clients.
A server MUST NOT send puzzles for a GREASE puzzle type. A server
MUST treat received GREASE puzzle types as unsupported, and ignore
them. Note that this can be implemented without special processing
on the server, as this matches the normal behavior for unsupported
puzzle types.
6. Proposed Client Puzzles
Having multiple client puzzle types allows good clients a choice to
implement puzzles that match with their hardware capabilities
(although this also applies to bad clients). It also allows “broken”
puzzles to be phased out and retired, such as when cryptographic
weaknesses are identified.
6.1. Echo Client Puzzle Type
The echo ClientPuzzleType is intended to be trivial. The
client_puzzle_challenge_response data field is defined to be a token
that the client must echo back.
During an initial ClientHello, this MUST be empty (zero-length).
During HelloRetryRequest, the server MAY send a cookie challenge of
zero or more bytes as client_puzzle_challenge_response . During the
retried ClientHello, the client MUST respond by resending the
identical cookie sent in the HelloRetryRequest.
6.2. SHA-256 CPU Puzzle Type
This puzzle forces the client to calculate a SHA-256 [RFC5754]
multiple times. In particular, the server selects a difficulty and a
random salt. The client solves the puzzle by finding any nonce where
a SHA-256 hash across the nonce, the salt and a label contains
difficulty leading zero bits.
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struct {
uint16 difficulty;
uint8 salt<0..2^16-1>;
} SHA256CPUPuzzleChallenge;
struct {
uint64 challenge_solution;
} SHA256CPUPuzzleResponse;
difficulty filter affecting the time to find solution.
salt A server selected variable-length bytestring.
challenge_solution The solution response to the puzzle, as solved by
the client.
To find the response, the client must find a numeric value of
challenge_solution where:
SHA-256(challenge_solution || salt || label) contains difficulty
leading zeros.
where “||” denotes concatenation and where label is the NUL-
terminated value “TLS SHA256CPUPuzzle” (including the NUL
terminator).
Clients offering to support this puzzle type SHOULD support a
difficulty value of at least 18. [[TODO: is this a good value?
https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Non-specialized_hardware_comparison has a
comparison of SHA256 on various hardware.]]
6.3. SHA-512 CPU Puzzle Type
The SHA-512 CPU Puzzle Type is identical to the “SHA256 CPU Puzzle
Type” except that the SHA-512 [RFC5754] hash function is used instead
of SHA-256. The label used is the value “TLS SHA512CPUPuzzle”.
Clients offering to support this puzzle type SHOULD support
difficulty values of at least 17. [[TODO: is this a good value?]]
6.4. Equihash: Memory-hard Generalized Birthday Problem Puzzle Type
Using Equihash, the asymmetric memory-hard generalized birthday
problem PoW [NDSS2016], this puzzle will force a client to use a
significant amount of memory to solve. The solution to this puzzle
can be trivially verified.
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struct {
uint16 n;
uint16 k;
uint16 difficulty;
uint8 salt<0..2^16-1>;
} BirthdayPuzzleChallenge;
struct {
uint8 V<20>;
uint8 solution<0..2^16-1>;
} BirthdayPuzzleResponse;
salt A server selected variable-length bytestring.
n, k parameters affecting the complexity of Wagner's algorithm.
difficulty secondary filter affecting the time to find solution.
V 20 byte nonce used in solution.
solution list of 2^k (n/(k+1)+1)-bit nonces used in solution,
referred to as xi below.
In the further text, the output of blake2b is treated as a 512-bit
register with most significant bits coming from the last bytes of
blake2b output (i.e. little-endian conversion).
To compute the response, the client must find a V and 2^k solutions
such that:
blake2b(salt||V||x1) XOR blake2b(salt||V||x2) XOR … XOR
blake2b(I||V||x(2^k)) = 0 blake2b(label||salt||V||x1||x2||…||x(2^k))
has difficulty leading zero bits.
where “||” denotes concatenation and where label is the NUL-
terminated value “TLS BirthdayPuzzle” (including the NUL terminator).
Incomplete bytes in nonces xi are padded with zero bits, which occupy
the most significant bits.
The client MUST provide the solution list in an order that allows a
server to verify the solution was created using Wagner’s algorithm:
blake2b(salt||V||x(w_2^l+1)) XOR blake2b(salt||V||x(w_2^l+2)) XOR …
XOR blake2b(I||V||x(w*2^l+2^l)) has nl/(k+1) leading zero bits for
all w,l.
and two 2^(l-1)(n/(k+1)+1)-bit numbers Z1 and Z2 must satisfy Z1<Z2
where
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Z1 = x(w_2^l+1)||x(w_2^l+2)||…||x(w_2^l+2^(l-1)) Z2 =
x(w_2^l+2^(l-1)+1)||x(w_2^l+2)||...||x(w_2^l+2^l) as in([NDSS2016]
section 4A, 5C). The server MUST verify these intermediate
equations.
A solution can be found using Wagner’s algorithm as described in
[NDSS2016]. The amount of memory required to find a solution is 2 ^
(n/(k+1)+k) bytes. A solution requires (k+1)2^(n/(k+1)+d) calls to
the blake2b hash function.
Clients offering to support this puzzle type SHOULD support n, k
values such that 2^(n/(k+1)+k) is at least 20MB.
Servers SHOULD look to minimize the value of k as 2^k blake2b hash
operations will be required to verify a solution.
7. IANA Considerations
The IANA will need to assign an extension codepoint value for
ClientPuzzleExtension.
The IANA will need to assign an AlertDescription codepoint value for
puzzle_too_hard.
The IANA will also need to maintain a registry of client puzzle
types.
8. Security Considerations
A hostile server could cause a client to consume unbounded resources.
Clients MUST bound the amount of resources (cpu/time and memory) they
will spend on a puzzle.
A puzzle type with economic utility could be abused by servers,
resulting in unnecessary resource usage by clients. In the worst
case, this could open up a new class of attacks where clients might
be directed to malicious servers to get delegated work. As such, any
new puzzle types SHOULD NOT be ones with utility for other purposes
(such as mining cryptocurrency or cracking password hashes).
Including fixed labels in new puzzle definitions may help mitigate
this risk.
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Depeding on the structure of the puzzles, it is possible that an
attacker could send innocent clients to a hostile server and then use
those clients to solve puzzles presented by another target server
that the attacker wishes to attack. There may be ways to defend
against this by including IP information in the puzzles (not
currently proposed in this draft), although that introduces
additional issues.
All extensions add complexity, which could expose additional attack
surfaces on the client or the server. Using cryptographic primitives
and patterns already in-use in TLS can help reduce (but certainly not
eliminate) this complexity.
An attacker that can force a server into client puzzle mode could
result in a denial of service to clients not supporting puzzles or
not having the resources to complete the puzzles. This is not
necessarily worse than if the server was overloaded and forced to
deny service to all clients or to a random selection of clients. By
using client puzzles, clients willing to rate-limit themselves to the
rate at which they can solve puzzles should still be able to obtain
service while the server is able to stay available for these clients.
It is inevitable that attackers will build hardware optimized to
solve particular puzzles. Using common cryptographic primitives
(such as SHA-256) also means that commonly deployed clients may have
hardware assistance, although this also benefits legitimate clients.
9. Privacy Considerations
Measuring the response time of clients to puzzles gives an indication
of the relative capabilities of clients. This could be used as an
input for client fingerprinting.
Client’s support for this extension, as well as which puzzles they
support, could also be used as an input for client fingerprinting.
10. Acknowledgments
The story of client puzzles dates back to Dwork and Naor [DN92] and
Juels and Brainard [JB99]. This draft was in large part based on the
2016 draft by Nygren et. al. [I-D.nygren-tls-client-puzzles], which
in turn was partially inspired by work done by Kyle Rose in 2001, as
well as a 2001 paper by Drew Dean (Xerox PARC) and Adam Stubblefield
(Rice) [SEC2001.DEAN], as well as being shaped by discussions with
Eric Rescorla, Yoav Nir, Richard Willey, Rich Salz, Kyle Rose, Brian
Sniffen, and others on the TLS working group. An alternate approach
was proposed in [I-D.nir-tls-puzzles]. Some similar mechanisms for
protecting IKE are discused in [RFC8019].
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11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5754] Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", RFC 5754, DOI 10.17487/RFC5754, January
2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5754>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
11.2. Informative References
[DN92] Dwork, C. and M. Naor, "Pricing via Processing or
Combatting Junk Mail", Proceedings of Crypto'92 , 1992,
<http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/
pvp_abs.html>.
[I-D.nir-tls-puzzles]
Nir, Y., "Using Client Puzzles to Protect TLS Servers From
Denial of Service Attacks", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-nir-tls-puzzles-00, 30 April 2014,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nir-tls-
puzzles-00>.
[I-D.nygren-tls-client-puzzles]
Nygren, E., Erb, S., Biryukov, A., Khovratovich, D., and
A. Juels, "TLS Client Puzzles Extension", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-nygren-tls-client-puzzles-
02, 25 December 2016,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-nygren-tls-
client-puzzles-02>.
[JB99] Juels, A. and J. Brainard, "Client Puzzles: A
Cryptographic Defense Against Connection Depletion
Attacks", Proceedings of NDSS'99 , 1999,
<http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PAPERS/
pvp_abs.html>.
[NDSS2016] Biryukov, A. and D. Khovratovich, "Equihash: Asymmetric
proof-of-work based on the Generalized Birthday problem",
25 February 2016,
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<https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/
blogs-media/equihash-asymmetric-proof-of-work-based-
generalized-birthday-problem.pdf>.
[RFC8019] Nir, Y. and V. Smyslov, "Protecting Internet Key Exchange
Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Implementations from
Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks", RFC 8019,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8019, November 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8019>.
[RFC8701] Benjamin, D., "Applying Generate Random Extensions And
Sustain Extensibility (GREASE) to TLS Extensibility",
RFC 8701, DOI 10.17487/RFC8701, January 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8701>.
[SEC2001.DEAN]
Dean, D. and A. Stubblefield, "Using Client Puzzles to
Protect TLS", Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Security
Symposium , 11 August 2001,
<https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec2001/full_papers/
dean/dean.pdf>.
Authors' Addresses
David Venhoek
Tweede Golf B.V.
Email: [email protected]
Wouter Bokslag
Midnight Blue
Email: [email protected]
Marc Schoolderman
Tweede Golf B.V.
Email: [email protected]
Erik Nygren
Akamai Technologies
Email: [email protected]
URI: http://erik.nygren.org/
Samuel Erb
Akamai Technologies
Email: [email protected]
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Alex Biryukov
University of Luxembourg
Email: [email protected]
Dmitry Khovratovich
University of Luxembourg
Email: [email protected]
Ari Juels
Cornell Tech and Cornell University
Email: [email protected]
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Draft specification for adding DDoS protection measures to TLS1.3 based on client proof-of-work.
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