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Fix command injection vulnerability in CI workflow via untrusted fork PR #439
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…nt variables
Replace direct interpolation of ${{ matrix.app.name }} in shell commands with environment
variables passed via the env: section. All paths are now quoted to prevent command injection
from untrusted fork PRs.
Affected jobs:
- e2e-local-dev: Setup canary, Resolve symlinks, Run E2E Tests
- e2e-local-prod: Setup canary, Run E2E Tests
- e2e-local-postgres: Setup canary, Run E2E Tests
Co-authored-by: pranaygp <[email protected]>
Direct interpolation of
${{ matrix.app.name }}in shell commands allows command injection from fork PRs that modifyscripts/create-test-matrix.mjs.Changes
${{ matrix.app.name }}interpolation with environment variables in shell commandsBefore:
After:
Jobs fixed
e2e-local-dev: Setup canary, Resolve symlinks, Run E2E Testse2e-local-prod: Setup canary, Run E2E Testse2e-local-postgres: Setup canary, Run E2E TestsView original Slack conversation
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